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I. INTRODUCTION
When most authors write about the professional discipline of
lawyers, they focus on ultimate outcomes and the procedures that
produce them. What misconduct did the lawyer commit? What sanction
was imposed? What mitigating and aggravating factors influenced the
ultimate sanction? Were the proceedings sufficiently fair? Were they
sufficiently open?
But much of the action, from the accused lawyer’s perspective, can
happen without a final determination being reached in a formal
disciplinary proceeding. Lawyers often have their right to practice
curtailed in very different ways. These go by many names —
administrative suspension, interim suspension, temporary suspension,
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summary suspension, automatic suspension, emergency suspension —
but they all share a common temporary loss of the right to practice
imposed with something less than a full disciplinary hearing.
States authorize the use of administrative and interim suspensions
in a variety of settings. They can be imposed to:
• Secure adherence to law-licensing requirements; 1
• Induce compliance with societal obligations imposed
outside the disciplinary process; 2
• Shelter the public from lawyers who have been found by
others to have engaged in professional misconduct or
serious criminal activity; 3
• Compel cooperation in the disciplinary process; 4 and
• Protect the public when continued practice by a lawyer
poses a substantial threat of serious harm. 5
Suspending a lawyer from practice, even for a limited period of
time, however, can have substantial negative consequences for the
lawyer, the lawyer’s clients, third-parties, and the legal system. 6 In this
article, I explore the differing rationales underlying each of these types
of suspension and whether, in each instance, suspension is the
appropriate tool to protect those interests, or whether less drastic
remedies would suffice. Upon balancing the legitimate interests
furthered by such suspensions against the substantial costs they impose,
I argue for tempering those consequences in certain settings, such as
pure administrative suspensions, and for employing less disruptive
sanctions wherever possible.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSIONS
Sometimes one’s right to practice is suspended for failure to follow
administrative requirements imposed by the state supreme court or the
bar as conditions for maintaining one’s law license. 7 In fact, the
1. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 20-67, 71, 93-100, 107-10, 181-84.
7. Many states recognize a distinction between administrative and disciplinary suspensions.
See, e.g., Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 297–98 (D.C. 2005); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d 1196,
1200 n.2 (Kan. 2006) (noting hearing panel’s analysis that rule providing that violation of a
suspension order constitutes grounds for disbarment applies only to disciplinary suspensions not
administrative suspensions); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 718 n.5 (Utah 2004) (collecting
examples). They often are administered by different bodies. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V, VI

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss1/5

2

Greenbaum: Administrative and Interim Suspensions
ARTICLE 5 GREENBAUM MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

ADMINISTRATIVE AND INTERIM SUSPENSIONS

2/7/2014 11:47 AM

67

imposition of administrative suspensions is quite common. 8 This section
examines the consequences of these suspensions, including how they
affect the lawyer, the lawyer’s clients, and the system, and discusses the
nullity rule, which nullifies work done by a lawyer who continues to
practice while under administrative suspension. The question in this
area is whether such suspensions are justified given the substantial
consequences they impose. I conclude that intentional and inadvertent
violations of administrative requirements should be treated differently,

and X (noting different entities are responsible for pursuing suspensions for disciplinary offenses,
failure to register, and failure to comply with CLE requirements); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d at
718–23 (noting that the Bar was authorized to enter administrative suspensions for failure to pay bar
dues, but disciplinary authorities were the body to pursue discipline for practicing while under the
suspension). Further, the consequences of such a suspension may be less severe. For example, in
the District of Columbia, unlike disciplinary suspensions, a lawyer under administrative suspension
is under no duty to notify clients and adverse parties of the suspension. Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 298; cf.
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel Case No. 23236, 728 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Minn.
2007) (distinguishing suspension for failure to comply with CLE requirements, for which no duty to
notify clients is imposed, with other suspensions which impose the duty). But see PA. R. DISCIPL.
ENF. 217 (requiring notice to clients and others where administrative suspensions are entered); In re
Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495, at *6 (Cal. State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t
June 19, 2012) (finding a violation of the duty of communication for failing to tell clients of
administrative suspension for failure to pay annual bar fees). Suspended lawyers can have the
suspension automatically lifted, without more, simply by meeting the relevant requirement. See
infra note 18. Since the suspension is only administrative, the lawyer will maintain an unblemished
disciplinary record in some jurisdictions. Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 298. In Ohio, an administrative
suspension is entered along with disciplinary sanctions on the Ohio Supreme Court’s website listing
of lawyers. See Attorney Discipline and Sanction History, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE
JUDICIAL
SYSTEM,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/AttyReg/
OHIO
Public_AttorneyDiscTrans.asp (last visited May 20, 2013). Thus the distinction may be lost on
prospective clients who check that site.
8. The number of such suspensions appears staggering. For example, in a 2005 decision,
counsel for the District of Columbia Board of Governors indicated that “approximately 2,200
members of the Bar are placed on administrative suspension each year.” Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 301
n.21. In Ohio, the number of those suspended for failure to comply with the Ohio Supreme Court’s
registration requirements varies widely across the years. In 2009 there were 233. In re Att’y
Registration Suspension, 915 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2009). In contrast, in 2011 there were only 67. In
re Att’y Registration Suspension, 957 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011). In Illinois, the number of lawyers
suspended for failure to register has been more than 1,000 a year from 2009 to 2012. ILLINOIS
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012, at 10
[hereinafter ILLINOIS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012]. Less dramatic numbers are seen for failure to
comply with CLE requirements. In Ohio, 57 such suspensions were entered in 2011 and 74 in 2012.
E-mail from Bret Crow, Ohio Supreme Court Public Information Officer, to Marissa Black (May
28, 2013, 9:21 EST) (on file with author). In Illinois, the numbers were 153 and 93. ILLINOIS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012, at 10. In Tennessee, 145 lawyers received such suspensions in both
2011 and 2012. See Order of Summary Suspension for Failure to Comply with the Rule for
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2012), available at
http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/clesuspend_083112.pdf; Order of Summary Suspension for
Failure to Comply with the Rule for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (Tenn., Aug. 31,
2011), available at http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/clesuspend_083111.pdf.
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that the nullity rule should only apply where the client knows of the
suspension and continues to rely on the suspended lawyer’s services, and
that alternative remedies to secure compliance with administrative
requirements should be considered.
Depending on the state, failure to comply with registration
requirements, 9 to pay bar dues in a unified-bar jurisdiction, 10 to meet
CLE obligations, 11 to provide annually required trust account
information, 12 or to comply with other administrative requirements 13 can
lead to automatic license suspension until the deficiency is cured.14
9. See, e.g., COLO. ST. R.C.P. 277(4)(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R. VI § (6)(B); PA. R. DISCIPL.
ENF. 219(f); R.I. SUP. CT. R., art. IV, R. 1(c).
10. See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 6; TEX. STATE BAR R. art. III § 5; cf. ARIZ. R. SUP. CT.
62(a)(2) (suspension “may” be entered); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 10.03(6) (lawyer “may be suspended”);
see also In re Montgomery, 242 P.3d 528 (Okla. 2010) (noting that lawyer was “stricken from the
roll of attorneys of the Oklahoma Bar Association for nonpayment of dues and noncompliance with
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education” and therefore was not authorized to practice law).
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 62(a)(3) & (5) (failure to complete mandatory CLE or the
new Admittee Professionalism course “may” lead to suspension); TEX. STATE BAR R. Art. XII §
8(E) (failure to complete CLE requirements results in automatic suspension from the practice of
law); VA. SUP. CT. R. § IV ¶ (17)(D) (failure to certify compliance with mandatory CLE “shall
cause suspension”). In re Smith, 939 P.2d 422 (Ariz. 1997); In re Continuing Educ. Requirements,
927 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2010); In re McGraw, 217 P.3d 25 (Kan. 2009); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 188
S.W.3d 426, 426–27 (Ky. 2006); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Kammerer, 14 S.W.3d 919 (Ky. 2000); In re
Rothenberg, 676 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 2004); In re Montgomery, 242 P.3d at 528 (noting that
“Petitioner was stricken from the roll of attorneys of the Oklahoma Bar Association for nonpayment
of dues and noncompliance with Mandatory Continuing Legal Education”); In re Wyllie, 957 P.2d
1222 (Or. 1998); In re Hankin, 804 P.2d 30 (Wash. 1991); Polk v. Office of Lawyer Regulation,
732 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 2007). See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Discipline of Attorney for
Failure to Comply with Continuing Legal Education Requirements, 96 A.L.R.5th 23 (2002 & Cum.
Supp.). Where noncompliance is accompanied by lies or misrepresentations about one’s CLE
compliance, more stringent disciplinary penalties may be imposed. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. § VI ¶
(17)(D) (explicitly recognizing this distinction). Zitter, supra, at § 4[b].
12. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 62(a)(4); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.15(i)(4).
13. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 9.200 (2012) (providing for administrative suspension for
failure to pay assessments to the state’s professional liability fund). Though this law was recently
amended by the Oregon legislature, the basis for administrative suspension was not altered. H.B.
2565, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
14. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, [Manual] LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 21:3001 (June 25, 2008).
A lawyer who does not meet compulsory continuing legal education requirements and
has not received some kind of extension or exemption is ineligible to practice. Like the
lawyer who neglects to file a required certificate of insurance, or who fails to pay bar
dues in a unified-bar jurisdiction, the lawyer is subject to automatic administrative suspension.
Depending on the circumstances, some states also treat this conduct as a separate disciplinary
offense warranting additional sanction. See, e.g., In re Horrell, 819 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (imposing an interim suspension for failure to register and then later imposing an
additional sanction finding the failure violated the rules of professional conduct as conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice); see also In re McDonald, 775 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 2001)
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Although admittedly a ham-handed tool, suspensions are justified in this
setting as a tool of last resort. 15 Typically, the lawyer has been sent
numerous notices of a need to comply with the requirement. 16 A lesser
penalty to induce compliance, such as charging a late fee, also has been
threatened. 17 Further, if an administrative suspension is entered, it
usually will be lifted upon compliance with the requirement that led to
the suspension in the first place. 18 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
officials in charge of administering these requirements, or imposing
sanctions for failure to comply, often scan the list of noncomplying
lawyers and make personal pleas to those they know to cure their
delinquencies. 19
As with any suspension from practice, however, the imposition of
an administrative suspension has potential consequences for the lawyer
involved, the lawyer’s clients, and third parties. For the lawyer,
adherence to the suspension interrupts his ability to practice. If the
(treating failure to comply with CLE requirements as a disciplinary violation for knowingly
disobeying the rules of a tribunal; here warranting a public reprimand when coupled with
noncooperation).
15. An immediate suspension for failure to comply with administrative requirements may
also have a protection of the public rationale as the failure suggests that the lawyer’s practice may
be out of control. See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 11, at 37 (noting that “inattention to CLE
requirements may presage a finding of inattention to other ethical and disciplinary rules” such as
neglect and failure to communicate with clients). But see In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1229
(D.C. 1988) (noting that “nonpayment of bar dues says little about . . . fitness to practice”).
16. See, e.g., In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495, *1 (noting
that Ms. Seltzer had been sent notice her membership fees were due, an e-mail reminder, a
delinquency notice, and a notice of suspension that could be cured, before binding suspension was
entered).
17. See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 6 (providing for notification of a late charge for failure
to pay bar membership fees, with suspension available only if charges and fees due are not timely
paid).
18. Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 298 (D.C. 2005); In re Steinbach, 427 So. 2d 733, 734
(Fla. 1983) (under rules then in force, reinstatement was automatic even where, as here, the lawyer
had not paid bar dues in Florida for years and there was a legitimate concern that he had not kept up
with changes in Florida law); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.6(13) (providing for reinstatement from
suspension for failure to meet mandatory CLE requirements upon showing of compliance and
payment of costs). But see State ex rel. Robeson v. Or. State Bar, 632 P.2d 1255, 1259–60 (Or.
1981) (noting respondent’s contention that in many jurisdictions reinstatement from administrative
suspensions is possible simply by coming into compliance with the obligation violated, but finding
that a provision requiring more, as was the case with the Oregon provision in question, was not
improper); Pennsylvania v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (noting that while a
suspension for failure to pay bar dues may be lifted upon payment, suspension for failure to
complete required CLE requires a “formal order of our Supreme Court after a showing that [the
attorney] had ‘the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission
to practice in the Commonwealth’”).
19. Confidential Posting, Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers Listserv (Oct.
21, 2005) (on file with author).
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suspension is treated as “a prior disciplinary offense,” it will be
considered as an aggravating factor should subsequent disciplinary
proceedings arise 20 or at least eliminate “absence of disciplinary
record” as a mitigating factor. 21
Yet, continuing to practice while under an administrative
suspension is the unauthorized practice of law, 22 which can have civil, 23
20. See Am. Bar Ass’n, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE 9.22(a) (1992).
Exactly which administrative suspensions fall in that category is unclear. For example, in Ohio,
failure to maintain one’s registration with the state supreme court is a disciplinary offense. See, e.g.,
Mahoning Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Kish, 961 N.E. 2d 172, 177 (Ohio 2012) (treating registration
suspension as a prior disciplinary offense, an aggravating factor, even though that suspension was
“brief[]”); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 956 N.E.2d 296, 300 n.1 (Ohio 2011) (treating
prior registration suspension as an aggravating factor). Nevertheless, “[a] registration suspension
may not weigh heavily against a respondent when the prior discipline consists only of a registration
suspension.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony, __ N.E. 2d __, ¶ 11 (Ohio 2014). In contrast,
failure to meet compulsory CLE requirements is not. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. X § 5(c);
Trumbull Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Ohlin, 977 N.E.2d 640, 641 n.1 (Ohio 2012) (finding that a CLE
suspension “shall not be considered in the imposition of a sanction for attorney misconduct”);
Disciplinary Counsel v. Murraine, 958 N.E.2d 942, 943 n.2 (Ohio 2011) (noting that the Governing
Bar Rule “prohibits consideration of an attorney’s failure to comply with CLE requirements in the
imposition of a [disciplinary] sanction”). Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court sometimes
considers the latter as well. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander, 977 N.E.2d 633, 635
(Ohio 2012) (treating as one aggravating factor both failure to pay registration fee on a timely basis
and failure to pay a fine for not completing CLE requirements).
21. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 20, at 9.32(a).
22. In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495 (Cal. State Bar Ct.
Review Dep’t June 19, 2012); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2006); In re Hanson, No.
57545, 2012 WL 436740 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012); Disciplinary Counsel v. Meehan, 975 N.E.2d 972,
976 (Ohio 2012); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. O’Neal, 852 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1993); Hill v. State,
393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 720–23 (Utah 2004).
But cf. State v. Lentz, 844 So. 2d 837, 842 (La. 2003) (deciding that continued practice while under
suspension for failure to meet CLE requirements is the unauthorized practice of law but noting that
“[t]he unauthorized practice of law during a period of suspension imposed by this court is a far more
serious infraction than similar conduct during a period of ineligibility imposed as a result of the
failure to comply with mandatory CLE,” here in the context of whether such practice constitutes the
ineffective assistance of counsel).
The courts are split over whether actual notice of the suspension is required before
continued practice will be seen as the unauthorized practice of law. Compare State ex rel. Okla. Bar
Ass’n v. Whitworth, 183 P.3d 984, 992 (Okla. 2008) (dismissing charge that lawyer committed the
unauthorized practice of law by practicing while under suspension because it was plausible that
lawyer lacked notice of his suspension), and In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d at 726 n.13 (“[W]hen
seeking disciplinary sanctions against an attorney for practicing law while administratively
suspended, it is the Bar’s burden to establish that the respondent attorney received actual notice of
the suspension and continued to practice law with knowledge of that suspension.”), with Seltzer,
2012 WL 5406495, at *4-5 (concluding that the lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
for practicing while under suspension for failure to pay bar dues even though lawyer was unaware
of failure to pay), and Meehan, 975 N.E.2d at 976 (imposing a two year stayed suspension for
continuing to practice while under administrative suspension for failure to renew his registration
even though he immediately ceased practice upon learning of his suspension). Cf. Jones v. Jones,
635 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (treating as a nullity filing of an appeal where it was filed
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criminal 24 and disciplinary consequences. 25 Arguably, clients could
contest fees “earned” for services while under administrative suspension
as against public policy. 26 It might also lead to a contempt of court
finding for violating the terms of the suspension. 27
A case that well illustrates the collateral impact an administrative
suspension may have is In re Seltzer. 28 In this case, Ms. Seltzer alleged
she failed to receive four notices sent to her by the California State Bar
concerning the non-payment of her annual bar membership fees. 29

by a lawyer under administrative suspension even though the lawyer was unaware of the
suspension).
23. Much of the enforcement of unauthorized practice of law provisions is through civil
injunction or civil fine. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENT PROTECTION, 2012
SURVEY OF UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES, chart II (Apr. 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2012_upl_r
eport_charts.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that thirty-two jurisdictions provide for civil injunctions,
twenty-two provide for civil contempt and thirteen provide for civil fines) [hereinafter 2012 UPL
SURVEY]. Some states allow civil actions for those harmed by lawyers violating unauthorized
practice of law standards. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Parker, Poe, Adams, & Bernstein, L.L.P., 961 So. 2d
784 (Ala. 2006). See generally Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law
Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and Its Impact on Effective
Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 733–34 (2007) (identifying five states and the District
of Columbia as recognizing some form of private action for harm caused by unauthorized practice
of law).
24. Satterwhite v. State, 979 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc with four judges
dissenting) (upholding criminal conviction for the unauthorized practice of law of lawyer who
intentionally practiced while under suspension for failure to pay bar dues, even though the lawyer
subsequently paid those dues and was retroactively reinstated).
25. For example, in Texas, “[a]ny practice of law during such suspension shall constitute
professional misconduct and subject the member to discipline.” TEX. STATE BAR R. Art. III § 5.
This point is reiterated under the Texas disciplinary rules, which state that a lawyer shall not
“engage in the practice of law when the lawyer’s right to practice has been suspended or terminated
including situations where a lawyer’s right to practice has been administratively suspended for
failure to timely pay required fees.” TEX. DISCIPL. R. PROF. COND. 8.04(a)(11). Continued practice
while under administrative suspension implicates not only the unauthorized practice prohibition in
the disciplinary rules, but also provisions requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation when
the representation will result in violation of the disciplinary rules, prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and prohibiting a
lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. See,
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, 980 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ohio 2012); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d
1196 (Kan. 2006).
26. See, e.g., Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *6; cf. Birbower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank,
PC v. Super. Ct., 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
27. In re Wolfe, 961 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 2011) (finding that practicing while under interim
suspension for failure to pay bar dues and for a guilty finding in a criminal matter is contempt of
court). See generally 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 23, at chart II (reporting that 22 jurisdictions
provide for civil contempt as a remedy for the unauthorized practice of law).
28. Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495.
29. She claimed that the letters came to her secretary who routed them to the firm
bookkeeper, who failed to pay them, rather than to Ms. Seltzer. Id. at *5.
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Given her lack of response, Ms. Seltzer was suspended from practice.
Two weeks later she became aware of her suspension, immediately paid
her fees, and her license was reactivated. During the two weeks in
which she was suspended, but did not know it, she continued to practice
law, and even after she learned of her suspension, billed clients for work
she performed while under the administrative suspension.
One might think that this mix-up would not lead to further
discipline. 30 After all, Ms. Seltzer had practiced for twenty-eight years
without discipline. 31 By her account, she did not receive the notices that
she had dues to pay, 32 and she cured the problem the minute it came to
her attention. There was no question about the quality of her work
performed during her brief suspension. But that thought would be
wrong.
In continuing to practice while under administrative suspension, she
was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 33 By
billing for the work she did while under suspension, she was found to
have charged an illegal fee. 34 By failing to tell her clients about her
suspension once she learned of it, which would have alerted them that
they did not have to pay the fee, she was found to have violated the duty
Add to that failure to cooperate in the
of communication. 35
investigation, 36 and failure to release a file to a client in a timely
matter, 37 and you get “a two-year probationary period, conditioned on a
30. The decision to prosecute may have been influenced by other factors such as skepticism
about whether Ms. Seltzer really failed to receive four notices that her bar fees were due, her similar
claim that she failed to receive notices about the grievance filed against here, and her failure to
acknowledge the wrongfulness of her acts. At the sanctioning stage, the court found the latter factor
to be of “substantial weight.” Id. at *9.
31. Id. at *1. While this did not forestall prosecution, it was considered as a mitigating
factor. Id. at *8.
32. Ms. Seltzer argued that given her lack of knowledge of the suspension she lacked the
requisite intent to violate the disciplinary rules; i.e., her conduct did not constitute a “willful”
violation of the rules. Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *4. The court found that willfulness speaks to
the act itself, here holding herself out as a lawyer and practicing law while under suspension, not to
an intent to engage in conduct she knew to be wrong. Id. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea
Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010). Other courts have
excused continued practice where the lawyer did not know of the suspension. See discussion supra
note 22.
33. Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *4. While finding that Ms. Seltzer engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, the actual charge raised required that such action also constitute an act
of moral turpitude. Finding that Ms. Seltzer’s conduct did not rise to this level, since her
unauthorized practice was inadvertent, this charge was dismissed. Id. at *5.
34. Id. at *7.
35. Id. at *6.
36. Id.
37. Id. at *7.
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60-day actual suspension and a duty to repay the fee that she improperly
charged her client, plus interest.” 38
While severe, these consequences may be tempered. In some
jurisdictions, the administrative suspension may not support reciprocal
discipline, so a lawyer may continue to practice in another state if
licensed there. 39 Further, reinstatement may be automatic once the
deficiency is cleared, 40 so the lawyer who acts promptly may avoid
many of these consequences.
In some jurisdictions, once the
impediment is removed the reinstatement is retroactive to the time of its
imposition. 41 In addition, officials retain prosecutorial discretion in
deciding whether to pursue disciplinary actions against those practicing
while under administrative suspension. Missing a technical licensing
requirement by a few days while continuing practice may well be
overlooked, whereas long-continuing failures, coupled with continued
practice, may not. 42
Of even more concern than the impact of suspension on lawyers,
however, is the impact an administrative suspension could have on

38. Id.
39. Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 299 n.16 (D.C. 2005) (citing an earlier case that
dismissed a reciprocal discipline proceeding because “ an administrative suspension imposed by the
court of another jurisdiction, based on the member’s failure to participate in Continuing Legal
Education, did not warrant reciprocal discipline here”). But see In re Gross, 77 A.D.3d 10 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010) (imposing reciprocal discipline based on interim suspension entered in Ohio for
noncompliance with registration and CLE requirements); cf. In re Arthur, 732 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 2012)
(imposing reciprocal discipline where lawyer was sanctioned in another state for engaging in
practice while under an administrative suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gee, 971 N.E.2d 952
(Ohio 2012) (same).
40. See supra text accompanying note 18.
41. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 6.01(f) (providing for “retroactive” reinstatement upon
payment of delinquent registration fee); Tex. ST. B.R., art. 3, § 7 (providing that upon curing a
delinquency in paying bar dues “the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the member
restored to former status . . . retroactive to inception of suspension, but [that] shall not affect any
proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct”). Even with retroactive
reinstatement, however, a lawyer will still be liable for unauthorized practice of law for continued
practice while the suspension was in effect. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 6.05; Satterwhite v. State,
979 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Sherman, 945
S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App. 1997). Other states do not make reinstatement from administrative
suspensions retroactive in the usual case. See, e.g., In re Hartwig, 515 N.W.2d 265, 266-68 (Wis.
1994) (allowing for retroactive reinstatement for failure to report CLE compliance only upon
showing of “sufficiently compelling circumstances” usually involving the fault of another involved
in CLE administration); Sitcov, 885 A.2d, at 301-02 (finding reinstatement after curing failure to
pay bar dues retroactive only if the suspension resulted from error or omission by the Bar).
42. Interview with Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio, in
Columbus, Ohio (Mar. 11, 2013). See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 922 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1996)
(imposing three-year suspension where lawyer handled more than 150 cases over a five-year period
while under administrative suspension for failure to meet mandatory CLE requirements).
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clients. If the lawyer honors the suspension and ceases work on client
matters, the client is left in the lurch, scrambling to find other
representation. If the lawyer continues representing the client, the work
done on the client’s behalf may be considered a nullity.
In many jurisdictions, actions taken on behalf of clients by
individuals who are not authorized to practice law there are considered
invalid under the so-called “nullity rule.” 43 For example, the filing of a
complaint by one unauthorized to practice is treated as though the
complaint was never filed, which might result in the running of the
statute of limitations before the problem is cured. Lawyers who have
been suspended from practice for any reason are not, during that period,
authorized to practice law. Even if the suspension arises from failure to
meet one’s CLE requirements, or failure to pay required registration fees
to the court or the bar, actions taken on a client’s behalf during that
period fall prey to this rule. 44 This may be true even where the lawyer
has no actual notice of the suspension. 45
This seems a harsh result. 46 The client is punished for the sins of its
lawyer whom the client thought was authorized to practice, but was
not. 47
43. States vary as to whether they recognize the nullity rule, and if they do, what exceptions,
if any, they allow. See, e.g., Downtown Disposal Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 979 N.E.2d 50, 54–
55 (Ill. 2012) (collecting cases); see generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Right of Party
Litigant to Defend or Counterclaim on Ground that Opposing Party or His Attorney Is Engaged in
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 7 A.L.R. 4th 1146 (1981 & Cum. Supp.). I do not address here
whether or not the nullity rule should exist in some form in some circumstances. Rather, I simply
recognize that the rule exists in some jurisdictions and address whether it makes sense for actions
taken by a lawyer under administrative suspensions.
44. See, e.g., Nerri v. Adu-Gyamfi, 613 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 2005) (complaint held a nullity
where filed by a lawyer on administrative suspension for non-compliance with CLE requirements,
failure to pay membership dues, and failure to file an insurance certification). The dissent was
“compelled to acknowledge that the majority’s holding . . . is consistent with the view held by the
majority of other jurisdictions.” Id. at 431 (Koontz, J., dissenting). For a contrary opinion, see
Owens v. Bank of Brewton, 302 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the nullity rule
should not be invoked to void an appeal filed by a lawyer who had been admitted to the bar but had
ceased to practice and failed to secure a required lawyer’s occupational license at the time the
appeal was filed).
45. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 635 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (appeal of action
treated as a nullity where it was filed by a lawyer under administrative suspension, even though the
lawyer was unaware of the suspension).
46. Cf. Geri L. Dreiling, Bright-Line Blunder, A.B.A.J. E-REPORT, Dec. 8, 2006, at 2
(quoting Hasting’s law professor, Rory Little, describing the application of the nullity rule in a
situation in which the suspension is administrative and unknown to the lawyer or the client as “just
outrageous”).
47. In rejecting the application of the nullity rule in an instance where out-of-state counsel
filed a complaint for a client in Florida but was not authorized under state law to do so, the Florida
Supreme Court instead allowed the pleading to be amended to be signed by a lawyer licensed in the
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Depending on the jurisdiction, however, exceptions may be
recognized to the nullity rule. The question becomes whether
suspensions for administrative failures should fall within these
exceptions. Opinions from Illinois, which has a particularly rich and
evolving case law on the nullity rule, provide a template upon which to
explore this issue.
For example, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 48 a circuit court
granted a motion to vacate an attorney fee award on the grounds that the
underlying activity which justified the award was conducted by
attorneys who were not authorized to practice since they had had failed
to register their corporate form with this Illinois Supreme Court, as
required. 49 The lower court reasoned that, because of this, the activity
was a nullity so no award could flow from it. 50 The Illinois Supreme
Court reversed, noting that the nullity rule applies when representation is
undertaken by those not licensed to practice law. Here, the lawyers were
licensed; they simply had failed to register their corporate form. While
that would have consequences if the lawyers attempted to claim their
corporate form for some purpose, such as to limit liability, it did not
undercut their work undertaken for clients. The nullity rule, as the court
explained, protects clients, other parties, and the courts from the dangers
of representation by those unlicensed to do so, but the mere act of failure
to register a corporate form does not raise those concerns. 51
The implications of Sperry are unclear. At its broadest, it suggests
that mere administrative failures are insufficient to trigger the nullity
rule. Failure to pay registration fees or to fulfill CLE requirements may
be seen to fall here. In this regard, it should be noted that the court
supported its argument, in part, on a case finding no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel violation where the lawyer representing the defendant
had failed to pay his annual registration dues with the court. 52
state. It did so because of the concern that “the nullity rule places the burden on the unwary litigant,
not the offending attorney” and that is “too harsh a penalty.” Torrey v. Leesburg Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
769 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 2000). But see Dreiling, supra note 46, at 1 (quoting Washburn law
professor, Shelia Reynolds, to the effect that while one might naturally feel sympathy for the client,
agency principles bind the client to the acts of its agent).
48. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. 2005).
49. Illinois requires those practicing in various corporate forms, such as an LLP or LLC, to
obtain a certificate of registration from the Illinois Supreme Court. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 721(c).
50. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d at 423.
51. Id. at 430–33. An oft-quoted description of the purpose the nullity rule is “to protect
litigants against the mistakes of the ignorant and the schemes of the unscrupulous and to protect the
court itself in the administration of its proceedings from those lacking requisite skills.” Janiczek v.
Dover Mgmt. Co., 481 N.E.2d 25, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
52. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d at 432. For further discussion of the impact practicing while under
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Read more narrowly, Sperry simply says that defects unrelated to
active licensure (here failure to register the firm’s corporate form) do not
trigger the rule. Suspensions for any reason, in contrast, compromise
licensure itself, and the rule should be in play absent other limitations
upon it.
A similar result was reached in Applebaum v. Rush University
Medical Center, 53 in which the Illinois Supreme Court refused to apply
the nullity rule where representation was undertaken by an attorney who
was on voluntary inactive status. The court stressed that the attorney
remained licensed to practice law. That he was not “entitled” to do so
because he had chosen to be on inactive status did not change this fact.
In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed the difference between
representation by those not licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction
and those who, although licensed, were otherwise ineligible to do so. 54
The Applebaum court also emphasized that the nullity rule should
only be invoked when its concerns, protection of clients and the court
from the harms that might arise from unlicensed representation, are
implicated. 55 Representation by unlicensed individuals raises those
concerns, whereas representation by a licensed attorney on inactive
status does not. In passing, the court recognized that because of the
harsh result the nullity rule imposes on clients, “it should be invoked
only where it fulfills its purposes of protecting both the public and the
integrity of the court system from the action of the unlicensed, and
where no alternative remedy is possible.” 56
As in Sperry, the implications of the Applebaum decision for
administrative suspensions are mixed.
The Applebaum court
characterized practicing while on voluntary inactive status as violation
of a “technical or administrative rule.” 57 Like Sperry, the court relied on
a case finding no Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation where the
lawyer representing the defendant had failed to pay his annual
registration dues with the court. 58 Failure to pay registration fees or to
complete the required CLE hours would seem to fall here.
The court set forth a multi-part test, limiting application of the
nullity rule to instances “where it fulfills its purposes of protecting both
administrative suspension has on the sixth amendment rights of defendants see infra text
accompanying note 67.
53. Applebaum v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 899 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. 2008).
54. Id. at 270.
55. Id. at 272.
56. Id. at 266.
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id.
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the public and the integrity of the court system from the action of the
unlicensed, and where no alternative remedy is possible.” 59 This test
also argues against the imposition of the nullity rule for administrative
suspensions. It suggests that there are three factors to consider, all of
which must be implicated – (1) the need for protection of the public, (2)
the need for protection of the integrity of the court system, and (3) a lack
of an alternative remedy. Does failure to pay registration fees or to
fulfill CLE requirements harm both the public and the court? Arguably,
failure to pay a registration fee harms the court system, but not the
public if the latter is defined as those being represented. 60 Failure to
fulfill CLE requirements may harm both, as under-educated lawyers
threaten clients and courts alike. But in either case, there are alternative
remedies – fines, discipline, and other remedies recognized for the
unauthorized practice of law. 61
On the other hand, the Applebaum case arose out of a single
representation by the lawyer of the estate of his father to which the
lawyer was the sole beneficiary. The court minimized the misconduct
on these facts finding that although there was a failure to “comply with
the technical provisions of the rule [forbidding practice by those on
inactive status], it [was] less certain whether he violated its spirit . . . .” 62
Perhaps the court would have proceeded differently if the lawyer had
engaged in multiple representations of truly distinct clients.
In its most recent decision on this topic, the Illinois Supreme Court,
over a strenuous dissent, seemed to change its focus. In Downtown
Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, a corporation’s president filed
a complaint for administrative review when, in fact, the complaint had to
be filed by an attorney. 63 The court concluded that the nullity rule need
not be invoked on the facts before it and articulated a new test to
determine whether it should be applied. Under this test the court is to
consider:

59. Applebaum v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 899 N.E.2d at 266.
60. To the extent registration fees are used to pay for the disciplinary process, client security
funds, or access to justice programs, the public is harmed, but that does not appear to be the thrust
of the court’s test.
61. See, e.g., Torrey v. Leesburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 769 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 2000)
(rejecting the nullity rule and noting the availability of unauthorized practice of law remedies and
disciplinary actions where a complaint was filed by a lawyer neither licensed in the state nor
admitted pro hac vice); cf. In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495 (Cal.
State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t June 19, 2012) (imposing discipline for continued practice while under
an administrative suspension).
62. Applebaum, 899 N.E.2d at 273.
63. Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 979 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 2012).
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whether the nonattorney’s conduct is done without knowledge that the
action was improper, whether the corporation acted diligently in correcting the mistake by obtaining counsel, whether the nonattorney’s
participation is minimal, and whether the participation results in prejudice to the opposing party. The circuit court may properly dismiss an
action where the nonlawyer’s participation on behalf of the corporation
is substantial, or the corporation does not take prompt action to correct
64
the defect.

If this is the test, how should we treat representation by a lawyer under
suspension when that fact is unknown to the client? 65 Assuming the
lawyer’s status is unknown to the client, the issue then would seem to
turn on whether the suspended lawyer knew of the suspension, the
degree of the suspended lawyer’s participation while under suspension,
and whether true prejudice to the opposing party can be shown. Even
then, the court merely listed the factors to be considered rather than the
outcome if some, but not all, are implicated.
As for my recommendation, I think the rule drafters should spell
out clearly the implications of practicing while under an administrative
suspension. I believe the nullity rule should apply where the client
knows the lawyer is suspended but hires the lawyer anyway, unless the
lawyer misleads the client about his authority to act while under
suspension. Here, the client lacks clean hands and is not punished
unfairly by the rule. If the lawyer knows of the suspension, but the
client does not, penalties should be enforced against the lawyer, not the
client. 66
Concern also arises about the impact of administrative suspensions
64. Id. at 57.
65. One interesting appellate level case in Illinois seems to treat reasonable reliance that the
representative is a licensed attorney as sufficient to avoid imposition of the nullity rule. Janiczek v.
Dover Mgmt. Co., 481 N.E.2d 25, 26–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). There the court refused to apply the
nullity rule in an instance where the lawyer was in active practice when originally hired, but was
disbarred before he filed the complaint on the client’s behalf, and the client lacked knowledge of the
disbarment.
66. This seems analogous to the way we treat the attorney-client privilege where the
communication involves a suspended lawyer. As a general matter, the attorney-client privilege
applies to communication between a lawyer and a client involving legal services. An individual
who, although admitted to the bar, is not on active status or is under a suspension, should not be
treated as a lawyer for this purpose. See, e.g., 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5480 (1st ed. 1986). But see Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?,
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS), 2011 WL 9375, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011). In most jurisdictions,
however, an exception lies where the client reasonably believes that its confidant is a lawyer with
the authority to practice. See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.9.2 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS §72(1) reporter’s note to cmt (e) (2000).
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on the system. Substituting counsel for those suspended will lead to
delay in pending actions. In criminal proceedings, practice undertaken
by lawyers while suspended may lead clients to challenge their
convictions on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds. 67 While often
unsuccessful, they still occupy the court’s time.
What then is the solution? Is there a better way to assure bar dues
are paid, or CLE credits earned, without requiring the cessation of
practice and the attendant costs that imposes on clients, other parties,
and other lawyers, as well as the offending lawyer? Fines 68 coupled
with a requirement to cure the administrative delinquency or face
contempt charges, disciplinary actions, 69 even criminal penalties might
67. While jurisdictions vary, the vast majority of cases hold that representation by a lawyer
on administrative suspension is not the ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Ngo,
924 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1996) (holding “that representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney
who has been involuntarily enrolled on inactive status for MCLE noncompliance does not, in itself,
amount to [ineffective assistance of counsel]”); People v. Brigham, 600 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Ill.
1992) (noting that “[a]lthough the present issue is one of first impression for this court, other
jurisdictions have dealt with it on numerous occasions, almost unanimously concluding that an
attorney whose license has been suspended for failure to pay his dues still may be ‘counsel’ for sixth
amendment purposes”); Henson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 186, 194–195 (Tex. App. 1996) (same). But
see People v. Brewer, 279 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting “that the failure of an
attorney to remit his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently
interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests. For this reason, we
remand the instant matter for an evidentiary hearing in order that the following may be established:
first, whether defendant’s allegations with respect to his attorney’s suspension from practice are
accurate; second, whether the defendant received inadequate assistance of counsel”); Pennsylvania
v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 160–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding that failure to fulfill CLE
requirements over extended period of time reflects a lack of competence implicating ineffective
assistance of counsel).
68. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, CLE Comm’n v. Clendenin, 941 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1997)
(imposing a fine rather than suspension for “habitual violation of the CLE rules [because] [w]hile
imposition of such punishment would not be too severe, the effect would be to punish others such as
clients and courts who are not to blame for respondent’s violations”). This is not to suggest that
such a remedy if foolproof. Mr. Clendenin was subject to a later suit for similar misconduct in
intervening years, and again was fined rather than suspended, on the same rationale. Ky. Bar Ass’n,
CLE Comm’n v. Clendenin, 11 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2000). But cf. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Burnside, 50
S.W.3d 147, 148 (Ky. 2001) (imposing fine for failure to complete CLE with the caveat that
“[f]ailure to either pay the fine or complete the CLE requirements in the future will result in
suspension”). See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 78 (1998) (noting that
“fines may . . . provide more effective discipline in cases where enforcers may prefer expressive
sanctions because incapacitating sanctions are viewed as too harsh, but where expressive sanctions
alone may prove too mild and ineffective from a deterrence perspective”). By this logic, a fine
coupled with public reporting of the default might be preferable to interim suspension.
69. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Keesee, 892 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1995) (imposing a public
reprimand for failing to comply with CLE requirements and ignoring notices of CLE deficiencies
lawyer admitted receiving); cf. In re McDonald, 775 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 2001) (applying reciprocal
discipline to a Delaware judgment imposing public reprimand for CLE noncompliance and failure
to respond to disciplinary authority inquires).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 5
ARTICLE 5 GREENBAUM MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

80

AKRON LAW REVIEW

2/7/2014 11:47 AM

[47:65

be better devices to forestall the collateral consequences of
administrative suspension.
Ultimately, an assessment must be made about the effectiveness of
these alternatives. Is the threat of suspension a necessary inducement to
secure compliance with administrative requirements, or would other
approaches work as well? 70 Cost implications also must be considered
both in terms of the direct cost of pursuing each remedy and indirect
costs the remedies impose. 71
Whether the penalty invoked is an administrative suspension or
some other device, its imposition should be influenced by the culpability
of the lawyer. 72 I would treat flagrant disregard of a known obligation
and inadvertent failure to follow it differently. In the former situation, I
agree that some sort of sanction is warranted. In the latter, however, I
would suggest a different approach. Where it is clear that the lawyer has
not received notice, additional and different types of notice should be
tried. 73 Where it is unclear, as was the case in Seltzer, 74 I would still
70. See generally Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to
Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2011) (arguing, in the context of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
enforcement, that the threat of a suspension or debarment remedy would achieve greater compliance
than the threat of fine).
71. For example, to the extent the administrative misconduct involves failure to pay a fee
which, in turn, is used to support other endeavors, like a client security fund, and if the threat of
suspension spurs greater compliance, then substituting other remedies may have unintended
financial consequences. Alternatively, if a fine approach is used and it secures payment of not only
the fee but of the fine as well, the revenues collected might, in fact, increase. But cf. Ezra Ross &
Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and
Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 456 (2011) (noting that “[a]dministrative agencies never
collect the vast brunt of [the fines they impose]”).
72. A difficult issue arises if the failure to receive notice stems from the lawyer’s failure to
inform authorities when the lawyer’s address has changed, the most common cause for lack of
notice, which in turn results in a lack of compliance. See, e.g., John F. Harkness, The Aftermath of
Dues, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1988, at 5. Since the lawyer has a duty to keep a current address on file with
the authorities, the lawyer is ultimately responsible for the lack of notice and any administrative
defaults that result. See, e.g., Joyce E. Peters, Dues and Don’ts, WASH. LAW., July/Aug. 2002, at
16. Further, repeated failures to timely comply with administrative requirements may provide
constructive notice as to when the obligations fall. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 915 N.E.2d 103, 110
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding chronic late payment of Michigan attorney registration fees “supports a
conclusion that he knew he would be suspended from the Michigan bar for his non-payment” and
hence when the time for payment passed he knew he was practicing under suspension despite his
insistence that he had not received notice of his suspension). Nevertheless, if many of these cases,
at their core, are really about lawyers failing to keep up current addresses, one wonders how severe
a sanction that mistake should justify. Cf. In re Owusu, 886 A.2d 536, 540-41 (D.C. 2005)
(recognizing that absent some showing that failure to keep a current address is a deliberate act to
thwart a disciplinary proceeding, that act, and the failure to cooperate in a disciplinary proceeding of
which he received no notice because disciplinary authorities lacked a current address, is not a
disciplinary violation but only a violation of an administrative Bar rule).
73. See, e.g., In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 720–23 (Utah 2004) (refusing to allow
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impose a penalty, but it would be rescinded retroactively upon a
successful showing that notice of the required administrative action had
not been received.
Prosecutorial discretion also plays a role. Where the failure is
inadvertent, short lived, and quickly remedied once the lawyer learned of
the dues or CLE delinquency, disciplinary counsel should seldom pursue
ethics violations for limited practice undertaken while under
administrative suspension. While the lawyer may still suffer other
consequences for this unauthorized practice of law, such as possible fee
forfeiture, 75 if the time is short, few fees will be compromised and many
clients will still pay for the service, even if they have the right to
challenge those fees.
There also may be some need to assess whether all administrative
suspensions should be treated equally. For example, in the District of
Columbia, failure to file a registration statement with the bar results in a
mandatory summary suspension, whereas failure to pay dues does not. 76
Suspension is allowed in the latter case, but not required. In Ohio, a
suspension for failure to follow the state’s attorney registration
requirements is a disciplinary offense, whereas a suspension for failure
to meet compulsory CLE requirements is not. 77 In contrast, at least one
court has held that representing a criminal defendant while failing to pay
a registration fee should not be treated as ineffective assistance of
counsel, whereas such representation while under suspension for failure
to earn CLE credits, at least over an extended period, might be. 78
If a state decides to vary the consequences for different forms of
administrative suspension, it may be difficult to rank the violations.
Presumably failure to register should be treated most seriously as it
interferes with the state’s attempt to contact lawyers should questions
about their conduct be raised. This goes to the heart of the disciplinary
system. Filings pertaining to trust account activities might fall in this
category as well since the information is necessary to help track possible
trust account violations which can harm clients. In contrast, while
failure to comply with CLE requirements may harm the public if, by this
discipline for practicing under suspension where the lawyer did not receive actual notice of the
suspension and requiring mail service signed for by the attorney or personal service upon her). See
generally In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C. 1988) (providing that “reasonable claims to a
lack of knowledge of the suspension for failure to pay bar dues should be taken into account”).
74. See supra text accompanying note 29.
75. See supra note 26.
76. Compare R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 2(3) (registration), with id. § 6 (dues payment).
77. See supra note 20.
78. Commonwealth v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 159–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
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failure, the lawyer fails to keep up with developments in the law, the
harm to the disciplinary system is less direct.
III. OUTSIDE CONDUCT SUSPENSIONS
Another set of suspensions flow from failure to comply with other
requirements not directly related to law licensure. For example, in a
number of states, failure to pay taxes, 79 student loan debt, 80 or to be
found in default in making court-ordered child-support payments 81 can
79. IOWA CT. R. 35.22 (authorizing license suspension where an attorney owes at least
$1,000 in debt being collected by the Central Collections Unit (CCU) of the Iowa Department of
Revenue for delinquent court fines, unpaid taxes, or debt owed to the Department of Natural
Resources); see, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Iowa
2012) (noting earlier suspension under this provision). In Iowa, such suspensions are treated as
prior discipline, an aggravating factor in subsequent disciplinary actions. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Iowa 2012). In 2012, forty-two lawyers were
referred for suspension under this provision, and nine failed to resolve their defaults and were
suspended). E-mail from Wayne Cooper, Executive Officer, Iowa Department of Revenue, to
Arthur F. Greenbaum, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law (April 2, 2013 14:04 CST) (on file
with author).
In some states the automatic suspension flows from failure to pay an occupational tax
applicable to attorneys. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 32 (requiring suspension of lawyers who
fail to pay occupational tax for two or more consecutive years); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
191.1441(a) (West 2008) (suspension required for failure to pay occupational tax or related penalty
within 90 days after its due date). Unlike the Iowa provision, these are directly related to law
practice and are therefore more closely akin to administrative suspensions, but still differ as they are
intended as a revenue source for the state itself rather than part of the lawyer regulatory process.
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 191.145 (West 2008); E-mail from Garrett Guillory, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Tenn. Dep’t of Rev., to Ingrid Mattson, Reference Librarian, Moritz College of Law (June 14,
2013, 09:33 EST) (on file with author).
80. IOWA CT. R 35.21(authorizing automatic suspension of license to practice law in Iowa for
attorney who “defaults on an obligation owed to or collected by the College Student Aid
Commission”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (authorizing suspension for default or breach of
any obligation under any student loan, repayment contract, or scholarship without further review or
hearing); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11B (authorizing temporary suspension where student loan entity certifies
that a lawyer is in default on payment of a student loan guaranteed by a state or the federal
government); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1 (2008 & Supp. 2013) (authorizing, but not requiring,
suspension for student loan default); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18,
1996), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/miscdocket/96/96-9155.pdf; see generally
Terri Harris, Student Loan Default Could Result in License Revocation, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2010, at
14. The degree to which suspensions are entered for student loan defaults appears to vary widely.
For example, in Iowa, only one suspension has ever been entered under the rule. E-mail from Paul
H. Wieck II, Director, Iowa Office of Professional Regulation to Marissa Black (June 11, 2013,
14:32 EST) (on file with author). In contrast, in Texas, there are presently 309 attorneys whose
licenses are suspended due to student loan defaults. Telephone Interview by Marissa Black with
Sandy Garvin, Office Administrator of the State Bar of Texas Membership Department (June 28,
2013). To the extent the failure to repay student loans is done in bad faith, this may constitute a
standard disciplinary violation subject to full hearing and the range of disciplinary sanctions. See,
e.g., ILL. R. PROF’L COND. 8.4(i).
81. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.8.5; OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(A)(1)(b); MD. R. ON CTS.,
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trigger a suspension until payment is received or a payment plan is
entered into. 82 Provisions concerning license suspension for failure to
pay child support are, in fact, a requirement of federal law. 83 Similar
concerns are sometimes treated under the general protections authorizing
interim suspensions to prevent a threat of public harm. 84 This section
considers the efficacy of using the threat of suspension to secure
compliance with financial obligations unrelated to the practice of law. I
conclude that suspensions for default under such provisions should be
authorized only where a strong correlation between the default and a
threat of harm to the public or fitness to practice concerns can be shown.
In assessing whether to impose such suspensions, the circumstances
surrounding the default should be considered.
The justification for suspensions in this area is twofold. The first
JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-778(d); MINN. R. LAWYERS PROF. RESP. 30(a); N.J. CT. R. 5:7-5(e)(4); N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 90 (2-a.a). The failure to make such payments, in the face of a court order to do so,
may also give rise to a full disciplinary action as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
and conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. See, e.g., Disciplinary
Counsel v. Redfield, 878 N.E.2d 10, 12-13 (Ohio 2007) (finding these violations where the lawyer
was in substantial arrears in his child support over a multi-year period). Depending on the
circumstances, credit for the time served on the interim suspension may be given toward a
permanent suspension order. Id. at 14-15 (contrasting cases where credit has and has not been
given).
82. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(D)(1)(c) (predicating reinstatement from a suspension
for failure to pay child support on receipt of “[a] notice from a court or child support enforcement
agency that the . . . attorney is no longer in default under a child support order or is subject to a
withholding or deduction notice or a new or modified child support order to collect current support
or any arrearage due under the child support order that was in default and is complying with that
notice or order”); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18, 1996), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/miscdocket/96/96-9155.pdf (providing for reinstatement from
a suspension for student loan default upon the lawyer entering into a repayment agreement).
Sometimes applicable penalties, interest and fees will also need to be satisfied. See, e.g., TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 9 § 32.7 (conditioning reinstatement for suspension for occupational tax delinquency on
both curing the delinquency and satisfying these collateral obligations as well); TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 191.1441(b) (West 2008).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (2011) (codifying the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193)).
In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, each State must have in effect laws requiring the use of . . . [p]rocedures under which the State has (and uses in appropriate
cases) authority to withhold or suspend, or to restrict the use of driver’s licenses, professional and occupational licenses, and recreational and sporting licenses of individuals
owing overdue support or failing, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with subpoenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support proceedings.
Id.
84. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(iv) (allowing interim suspension on a harm to the public
rationale based on “the attorney’s willful failure or refusal to pay money owed to a client, which
debt is demonstrated by an admission, a judgment, or other clear and convincing evidence”). For an
application of this rule see In re Stewart, 934 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (entering an
interim suspension for failure to pay a $50,345.21 judgment).
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reflects a public policy that these are obligations with which we want all
citizens to comply. 85 The law-licensure system is simply a vehicle to
achieve these goals when the violator happens to be a lawyer. 86 Second,
is a fear that certain kinds of acts raise such serious fitness to practice
concerns that immediate license suspension is appropriate. 87 Exactly
what conduct is sufficiently reprehensible or predictive of broader
misbehavior in carrying out one’s practice, however, is an open
question.
For example, suspensions for failure to pay student loans have been
justified on the ground that such conduct calls into question “the
integrity of lawyers who either selfishly refuse to pay back their student
loans or have so mismanaged their finances that they are unable to pay
them back” and who may accordingly mismanage or convert client
funds. 88 The data, however, suggest otherwise.
85. In fact, license revocation is imposed for failure to pay child support or student loan
obligations across occupational categories. See, e.g., WESTLAW, 50 State Survey – Revocation of
Professional Licenses for Failure to Pay Support, 0080 SURVEYS 6 (2012) (listing state statues
mandating the revocation of a wide range of professional and occupational licenses for failure to
pay child support); Student Loan Borrower Assistance, License Revocations,
http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/collections/government-collection-tools/licenserevocations (last visited June 4, 2013) (noting that a number of states impose license revocation for
student loan defaults covering a variety of professions and vocations that require licensing). In this
article I only explore the propriety of such suspensions in the lawyer regulatory context, although
similar concerns may apply in other settings as well. Alternatively, if one embraces the general
proposition that license suspension is an appropriate collections tool, there may be no reason to treat
lawyers differently than those in other occupations.
86. See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, When Dad Won’t Pay, 86 A.B.A. J. 54, 56–57 (2000)
(quoting Teresa Kaiser, executive director of Maryland’s child support enforcement agency, stating
“Maryland, like many other states using license revocation as an enforcement tool, doesn’t limit
suspensions to driver’s licenses. Anyone who needs a Maryland license or certificate to pursue an
occupation-for example, a doctor, lawyer, architect or teacher-is subject to losing it for failure to
pay child support . . . . ‘The aim is not to suspend anybody’s license to practice their livelihood . . .
The aim is to collect money that is legally due to support their own children.’”).
87. Cf. George L. Blum, Annotation, Failure to Pay Creditors as Affecting Moral Character
for Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 108 A.L.R.5th 289, 289 (2003) (noting that, at the bar
admission stage, failure to pay creditors in a variety of contexts is seen both as a disregard for the
law and a possible inability to properly handle client funds in the future).
88. Harris, supra note 80, at 16; cf. In re Steffen, 261 P.3d 1254, 1255-56 (Or. 2011) (noting,
as part of the character and fitness inquiry, that “because lawyers frequently hold client funds in
trust, an applicant’s problems handling money (either the applicant’s own or funds belonging to
others) raises concern about the applicant’s ability to handle client funds with ‘scrupulous
probity’”). Even large debt loads that are being handled short of default may promote unethical
conduct. Based on anecdotal evidence, an Illinois state bar commission noted that “debt may place
additional pressure on lawyers to commit ethical violations” relating to competence, diligence, fees,
conflict of interest, safekeeping of client property, withdrawal, expediting litigation, professional
independence, and advertising. ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF LAW
SCHOOL DEBT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30
(March 8, 2013) [hereinafter IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT]. Further, failure to enroll in income-
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A recent Illinois report on the impact of law school debt on lawyer
conduct identified nine ethical rules that might be compromised by
lawyers with high student debt loads, but conceded that the state
disciplinary authority “has not noticed a significant number of debtrelated complaints against attorneys in the last several years, nor has it
noticed a disproportionate number of complaints against young attorneys
(those with the heaviest debt loads).” 89 Another recent study explored
the predictive effects of factors considered at the character and fitness
stage on the chance of later discipline in practice and found that “the
probability of subsequent discipline for someone with a student loan
default is . . . only 5%.” 90 The authors conclude that given this, student
loan default is a “very poor predictor[] of subsequent misconduct” and
thus probably should not be “sufficient to justify some kind of corrective
or preventive action.” 91 Whether this conclusion applies to law school
loan defaults while in practice is not clear, 92 but it certainly suggests
caution before concluding that such defaults pose a real threat to clients
or the public that must be curbed.
The impact of imposing suspensions for student loan defaults also
should be considered. Looking at law school debt alone, the ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admissions reports that for 2010-2011,
the latest year for which information is available, the average law school
loan debt for graduates who took out at least one law school loan was
$75,728 for public law schools, and $124,950 for private law schools. 93
Nearly 90 percent of all law students took out loans. 94 When
based repayment plans might itself suggest competence issues. See generally infra note 99.
89. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 30.
90. Leslie Levin, et al. A Study of the Relationship Between Bar Admissions Data and
Subsequent Lawyer Discipline. ___ LAW & SOC. INQUIRY ____ (2014).
91. Id.
92. Arguably defaults while in practice may pose a greater risk than earlier occurring
defaults. First, the default has occurred when the individual is older, thus minimizing the argument
that the default resulted from immaturity and might be overlooked. Second, pre-admission defaults
pose no direct threat to clients. Assuring that the applicant has a reasonable plan to handle the
problem in the future, before admission is allowed, may give regulators sufficient confidence that
future clients will not be harmed. In contrast, defaults by those already in practice, who thus have
access to clients, may create a temptation to take on representations that should be declined, charge
excessive fees, or steal client funds to help make ends meet. On the other hand, one might expect
such improper behavior to stave off defaults, and the Illinois study cited above did not find that to
date.
93. Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001-2010, A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC.
AND
ADMISSIONS
TO
THE
Bar,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/avg_amnt_brwd.authcheckda
m.pdf.
94. Almanac of Higher Education: Trends in Student-Loan Debt for Graduate and
Professional Students, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 24, 2009),
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undergraduate debt and other law-school related costs are included,
“debt burdens of upwards of $150,000 or even $200,000 [are]
common.” 95
While debt loads are on the rise, the job prospects for lawyers
remain weak. The National Association of Law Placement reported that
the employment rate for the Class of 2011 was the lowest since 1994 and
reflected “a job market that continued to have underlying structural
weakness.” 96 The data for the Class of 2012 show slight improvement
on some measures, but those reported as “unemployed/seeking” rose to
more than 10% of the graduates. 97 Even those with jobs often have
salaries far too low to make their requisite loan payments. 98
In a world of diminished job prospects and rising debt, student loan
defaults are likely to rise. 99 The threat of suspension, in this context,
http://chronicle.com/article/Trends-in-Student-Loan-Debt/48056/.
95. IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 13.
96. Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP BULLETIN (July
2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research.
97. ABA Releases Class of 2012 Law Graduate Employment Data, ABA DIVISION FOR
COMM. & MEDIA REL. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.abanow.org/2013/03/aba-releases-class-of2012-law-graduate-employment-data/.
98. See, e.g., IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 14 (noting that the median
starting salary of the law school Class of 2011 was $60,000, which given their average debt,
constituted “an unsustainable level of debt” which for an “increasing number of young attorneys is
staggering”).
99. See Issac Bowers, Explore the Role of Underemployment in the Student Debt Crisis, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 13, 2013) http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loanranger/2013/03/13/explore-the-role-of-underemployment-in-the-student-debt-crisis (noting that the
“inevitable result” of the rise in law school graduate indebtedness “has been a spike in . . .
defaults”); cf. Jonathan Noble Edel, The Phyrric Victory of American Higher Education: Bubbles,
Lemons, and Revolutions, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1560 (2013) (predicting increased default
rate on federal student loans when the gap between salary earned and debt owed rises). The extent
to which this will occur, however, remains in doubt.
Unraveling the degree to which there will be a default crisis is a difficult task. First,
student loans may come from both public, typically the federal government, and private lenders.
Financial Aid: An Overview, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/jd/financinglaw-school/financial-aid-overview (last visited June 5, 2013). For federal loans, a variety of
vehicles are available to accommodate an individual who cannot meet the loan payment, including
pay as you earn programs, income-based repayment, and hardship accommodations, among others.
See Repay Your Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans (last visited
June 5, 2013). Further, federal borrowers are assigned to federal loan servicers, who arguably could
help student-loan debtors enter into affordable payment schemes, or forbearance if that is not
possible, to avoid defaults. See Understanding Repayment: Loan Servicers, FEDERAL STUDENT
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/servicers (last visited June 5, 2013). These
sorts of protections, if available at all, typically are not as robust with private loans. Federal Versus
Private Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last
visited June 5, 2013). The license suspension provisions for failure to meet student loan obligations
vary in terms of their coverage. See IOWA CT. R. 35.21 (authorizing automatic suspension of
license to practice law in Iowa for attorney who “defaults on an obligation owed to or collected by
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seems an undue burden absent greater proof of a tie between default and
fitness to practice. 100
the College Student Aid Commission” which guarantees federal loans); HAW. REV. STATS. §§ 436
C-1, 605-1 (2008) (authorizing suspensions for defaults on or breaches of Hawaii or United Statesbased student loans); N.J. CT. R. 1-20-11B (authorizing temporary suspensions for nonpayment or
default of a state or federal direct or guaranteed educational loan); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1
(2005 & Supp. 2013) (authorizing attorney suspension after notification of default on federal loans
guaranteed by State Regents); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18, 1996)
(authorizing attorney suspension after notice of default on federal loans guaranteed by Texas
Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation).
To the extent the license revocation provisions focus on federal loans, which afford an
array of options to match monthly payments to ability to pay, one might assume that the chance of
default, absent neglect or willful avoidance, would be small. Peter Coy, The Needless Tragedy of
Student Loan Defaults (Nov. 28, 2012), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK: MARKETS & FINANCE,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-28/the-needless-tragedy-of-student-loan-defaults
(last visited June 11, 2013). Nevertheless, learning about and accessing these loan modification
programs is not an easy task. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Loan Moans, A.B.A. J., March 2013, at 32
(describing hurdles lawyers face in securing federal student loan modifications). In fact, loan
servicers who might facilitate this task often fail to do so. As one prominent expert on student loan
debt wrote to me, “federal loan servicing is NOT part of the reason federal default should be
uncommon, but indeed is part of the reason that federal default is higher than it ought to be.” E-mail
from Heather Jarvis to Arthur Greenbaum, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law (June 17,
2013) (on file with author); see also Ann Carrns, Keeping a Closer Eye on Student Loan Servicing
Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/keeping-a-closereye-on-student-loan-servicing-firms/ (last visited June 11, 2013, 12:06 EST) (noting that loan
servicers sometimes fail to keep in timely communication with the debtor, or give inaccurate advice
which leads to default). To the extent there are identification or administrative errors resulting in
defaults, statutes vary over whether they can be considered by the state supreme court or its delegee
before suspension is entered. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (upon certification of
student loan default, suspension “shall be entered without further review or hearing”), with IOWA
CT. R 35.21(d) (limiting the scope of review of a lawyer student loan default suspension “to
determining if there has been a mistake of fact relating to the attorney’s delinquency”). These
choices may well be a consequence of the rigor of the procedures required before the default is
referred.
100. Cf. Dennis P. Harwick, “Don’t Shoot the Messenger” The Story of the Student Loan
Default/License Suspension Rule, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, 15 (March 1997) (noting the vehement
objections to such a rule by the Washington Bar Association and lawyers around the state because
the rule was unnecessary, given that substantial remedies were already available for defaults,
“illogical,” and improper in the face of a difficult job market). For these and other reasons, local
bar associations, practice-specific bars, affinity-group bars, and individuals were unanimous in their
opposition to a proposed lawyer-suspension rule for student loan defaults in Tennessee. Christopher
D. Markel, et al., Comments on the Proposed Amendment to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9
Section 34 (Proposed May 18, 2009), Admin. Office of the Courts (Dec. 7, 2009-Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (unanimously
opposing adoption of the proposed rule).
A similar critique could be made about child support and tax defaults as well. The
correlation to fitness to practice remains strained. However, failure to meet child support
obligations may constitute violation of a court order and we may see that as more egregious conduct
than mere failure to live up to a financial obligation. Failure to pay income tax may show a serious
disregard for the law, but that depends on the nature of the underlying conduct. If it is criminal in
nature, and conviction or a guilty plea results, an interim suspension is likely to be granted on a
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This is not to say that failures to pay taxes, defaults on student
loans, or violations of child-support orders always are irrelevant, but
perhaps they should lead to temporary suspension only when a clear
threat to the public from continued practice can be shown. 101 Even if
not, at least the surrounding circumstances should be considered before a
suspension is entered. 102 For example, one might want to know the
circumstances which led to the default and the attorney’s plans to cure
it. 103

prior finding of misconduct grounds. See generally infra Part IV.
101. See generally infra Part VI.
102. States vary in terms of whether lawyers are given a chance to explain and avoid
suspension in this area. For example, states vary in terms of whether being in arrears in childsupport payments requires a suspension or whether other factors can be considered that might
undercut the propriety of suspension. Several states provide that being in arrears on child-support
payments requires suspension without mentioning that consideration of other factors would be
appropriate. OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(A)(1)(b) (authorizing suspension upon a “final and
enforceable determination” of default under a child support order); MINN. R. LAWYERS PROF. RESP.
R. 30(a) (authorizing suspension upon “receipt of a district court order or a report from an
Administrative Law Judge or public authority” that lawyer “is in arrears in payment of maintenance
or child support and has not entered into or is not in compliance with an approved payment
agreement for such support”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (2-a.b) (providing that “[t]he only issue to be
determined as a result of the hearing [for failure to pay child-support] is whether the arrears have
been paid. No evidence with respect to the appropriateness of the court order or ability of the
respondent party in arrears to comply with such order shall be received or considered by the
disciplinary committee”). In contrast, while Colorado allows for an administrative suspension for
failure to pay child support, its imposition is not automatic. COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.8.5. Suspension
may be avoided by showing that:
(1) there is a mistake in the identity of the attorney; (2) there is a bona fide disagreement
currently before a court or an agency concerning the amount of the child support debt,
arrearage balance, retroactive support due, or the amount of the past-due child support
when combined with maintenance; (3) all child support payments were made when due;
(4) the attorney has complied with the subpoena or warrant; (5) the attorney was not
served with the subpoena or warrant; or (6) there was a technical defect with the subpoena or warrant.”
Id.; accord MD. R. ON CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-778(d) (“A referral from the Child Support
Enforcement Administration to the Attorney Grievance Commission is presumptive evidence that
the attorney falls within the criteria specified in Code, Family Law Article, § 10-119.3 (e)(1), but
the introduction of such evidence does not preclude Bar Counsel or the attorney from introducing
additional evidence or otherwise showing cause why no suspension should be imposed.”). The
different approaches chosen may be a function of the comparative richness of the procedures
preceding the suspension request.
103. For example, at the admissions stage, jurisdictions explore financial issues as part of the
character and fitness inquiry, but they take a holistic approach to the question. See, e.g., In re
Pillette, 829 So. 2d 1011 (La. 2012) (conditionally admitting applicant to practice law upon
sufficient explanation of the details surrounding financial delinquencies and future good faith efforts
to satisfy the obligations during one year probationary period).
Similarly, an isolated failure to pay taxes, in the right circumstances, will not lead to a
denial of admission. See, e.g., In re Scallon, 956 P.2d 982, 986-87 (Or. 1998). In deciding to allow
a Wisconsin lawyer’s admission to the Oregon bar, despite an isolated failure to pay taxes, the court
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Admittedly, the referring entity may have explored these
circumstances when attempting to reach an accommodation before
referral, 104 but they do so for a different purpose than to assess the
fitness of the lawyer to continue to practice law while the debt
remains. 105 It is ultimately for the state supreme courts or their delegees
extensively explained its reasoning:
Applicant always has filed income tax returns and acknowledged the taxes that he
owed. For the most part, he has paid them. He himself has acknowledged that, when he
failed to pay his taxes, his failures were his own doing and responsibility. Applicant has
made at least small inroads on his tax obligations during even financially limiting circumstances and has held out the hope that he could satisfy all the obligations in full
when he received his share of the attorney fee for the case in which he had been involved
in Wisconsin. As we have noted, supplemental information shows that he has fulfilled
that hope.
We think that the following statement — also by the opposing half [of the state
Board of Bar Examiners] — better sums up this case and the factors that we find most
pertinent:
“This is a close case and a difficult decision. Several practitioners and judges have attested to Applicant’s good moral character, and have lauded Applicant’s skill and integrity in the practice of law. There is no evidence that Applicant has committed fraud, deceit, or any crimes of moral turpitude. There is no evidence that Applicant has ever
cheated a client nor that Applicant’s handling of his financial affairs has ever left a client
shortchanged.”
We agree with that description of the record. We understand it to mean that the opposing half accepts as a general proposition that applicant is a person of good moral
character, subject only to a lingering doubt as to whether he was wholly committed to
satisfying his tax obligation. As noted, applicant’s actions now have laid that issue to
rest. The opposing half’s surviving concern consists of doubts that applicant has demonstrated his fitness to practice law.
For our part, we are satisfied on that score, as well. Applicant appears always to
have had his clients’ best interests in mind, so much so that he stopped practicing law at
a time when he no longer felt fit to represent those clients adequately. No issues have
been raised concerning his competence. That demonstrates to us that applicant has had,
and continues to have, the fitness to appreciate and to engage in the practice of law.
It also appears to us that applicant understands and appreciates the reasons that led
to his past financial difficulties, is determined to avoid their repetition, and is capable of
carrying out that determination. In that regard, applicant is willing to accept the recommendation of the favoring half that he be admitted conditionally.
In re Scallon, 956 P.2d at 986-87.
104. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (incorporating by reference section 436C-3
which predicates suspension for student loan default on prior district court finding of default and
ability to pay without hardship); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1(B) (2005 & Supp. 2013) (allowing
State Regents to consider “hardship circumstances” before referring student loan default to licensing
authority for possible license suspension).
105. Process concerns also may arise. The nature of the hearing provided, the qualifications of
the fact finder, and the standard of proof required may make the decisions some entities reach
subject to question. See, e.g., Letter from Russell W. Savory to Michael W. Catalano, Clerk of the
Tennessee Supreme Court (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/commentsproposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (bankruptcy and debtor-creditor attorney commenting on a
proposed lawyer student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee on the need for appropriate
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to reach this decision. 106
Requiring the state courts to determine in each case whether a
default should lead to suspension, rather than simply ordering
suspension upon notification of default, admittedly has resource
implications, but they may be overstated. To the extent a jurisdiction
determines that default on certain obligations most often requires
suspension, I would make the issuance of suspension presumptive upon
notice of the default being given by the appropriate entity to the court, or
its designated agent. The burden would then fall on the lawyer to show
cause why the suspension should not go into effect. Those without a
colorable excuse often would not contest the suspension’s entrance.
Finally, the costs of these suspensions need to be considered. As
noted previously, any suspension has costs for the lawyer involved, his
clients, his family, other lawyers and their clients, and the system. 107 A
suspension for failure to pay a financial obligation has additional costs
beyond the suspension itself. If failure to pay is a function of present
inability to do so, suspension, which may take away one’s sole
livelihood, is likely to exacerbate the non-payment problem, not improve
it, as it only makes satisfying the obligation more difficult. 108 Further,
while the threat of suspension upon default may promote compliance
with this obligation, it may force lawyers to forgo other obligations in
prioritizing their debt. To the extent the threat of suspension is for
default on a student loan, which typically is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy, lawyers may be forced into bankruptcy to get relief from
their other debts so that they can pay their student loans and keep their
licenses. 109 Finally, such a provision is likely to have a disproportionate
administrative procedures before referral and meaningful opportunity to appear before the state
supreme court before entrance of a suspension); Rickey E. Wilkins, on behalf of the Memphis Bar
Association, to Mike Catalano, Appellate Court Clerk, at 2 (March 1, 2010),
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (complaining
about the lack of procedural protections in proposed lawyer student loan default suspension rule in
Tennessee).
106. See, e.g., Rickey E. Wilkins, on behalf of the Memphis Bar Association, to Mike
Catalano,
Appellate
Court
Clerk,
at
2
(March
1,
2010),
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (raising this
concern in opposition to a proposed student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee).
107. See supra text accompanying note 6.
108. John Jurco, Comment, Ohio’s Government Bar Rule V: Innovation or Derogation?, 30
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 119, 136 (2004); cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Redfield, 878 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio
2007) (noting the difficulty loss of a law license had on respondent’s ability to pay child support
arrearage and have the suspension lifted). That said, I do not want to overstate this point. The
deterrent effect the threat of suspension has on defaults might outweigh the costs imposed in
individual cases where the default becomes more difficult to cure.
109. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 105 (raising this concern in opposition to a proposed
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impact on law students from low-income families, often minorities, who
often leave school with larger debt 110 and those with debt in private
practice who serve low-income clients. 111 These are unintended
consequences that should be avoided.
Absent a clear correlation between these defaults and potential
harm to clients, using suspension in this way seems suspect. Unless
carefully cabined, the lawyer-disciplinary process may be hijacked by
such requirements to meet concerns insufficiently related to fitness to
practice and protection of the public from unethical lawyer conduct, the
proper focus of the disciplinary process. 112 But even if one concludes
that such conduct raises a red flag about a lawyer’s fitness to practice,
the lawyer should at least be given the opportunity to rebut those
concerns before suspension is entered.
IV. SUSPENSIONS PREMISED ON A PRIOR FINDING OF MISCONDUCT 113
Yet another set of interim suspensions is authorized for lawyer
misconduct discovered in another setting. Both discipline in another
jurisdiction 114 and conviction of or a finding of guilt for a serious
criminal offense 115 may trigger disciplinary actions. 116 In either case,

lawyer student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee).
110. See, e.g., CREOLA JOHNSON, IS A LAW DEGREE STILL WORTH THE PRICE?: IT DEPENDS
ON WHAT THE LAW SCHOOL HAS TO OFFER YOU 254-57 (2013); IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT,
supra note 88, at 25-26 (noting that “blacks and Hispanics are significantly more likely to leave law
school with debt than whites, and their debt loads tend to be larger”).
111. See, e.g., Letter from Brent Heilig, an attorney, to Michael W. Catalano, Appellate Court
Clerk (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendmentssc-rule-9 (noting, in a comment filed in opposition to a proposed student loan default suspension
rule in Tennessee, that lawyers representing poor clients may have difficulty getting paid which
might lead to an increased chance of student loan default).
112. Cf. Harris, supra note 80, at 16 (worrying that providing for license suspensions for
student loan defaults may just be “bowing to public pressure” and providing “a powerful collection
tool” for student loan agencies which is not the focus of the lawyer disciplinary process).
113. The preceding section also involved prior findings of misconduct, there default on
specified financial obligations. I nevertheless have chosen to treat these sections differently. The
former is driven in large part by a collections rationale without a clear link to fitness to practice.
The suspensions treated here, for disciplinary sanctions imposed by another jurisdiction, or for a
conviction of or guilty plea to a serious crime, are more clearly associated with fitness concerns.
The proceedings underlying the prior finding of misconduct also may create more confidence in the
prior determination reached than with financial default suspensions.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 117-33.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 134-43.
116. For a discussion of the duty to report these matters to disciplinary counsel, as well as
some suggestions on how to draft appropriate language to implement them, see Arthur F.
Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to Disciplinary Authorities: Filling the
Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 486–99 (2012). Portions of this section are adapted from that
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interim suspensions are sometimes used while the court determines what
final disciplinary sanction to impose. My focus, here, is on the role, if
any, interim suspensions should play in this process. I conclude that
interim suspensions for reciprocal discipline often are not necessary
since the reciprocal discipline process is itself quite streamlined, making
an interim protective act (interim suspension) largely superfluous. As to
interim suspensions for criminal misconduct, I conclude that the use of
interim suspensions seems well justified in the usual case and flexibility
remains to forgo interim suspensions when they are not.
The first situation is captured in the concept of reciprocal
discipline. 117 Under this concept, the discipline of a lawyer in one
jurisdiction will be looked to by other jurisdictions in which the lawyer
is licensed or otherwise permitted to practice.118 The second jurisdiction
automatically imposes the same sanction as the first, unless the lawyer
can show cause why that should not be the case. For example, suppose
Lawyer A is licensed to practice in Ohio and Michigan. If Michigan
found A to have violated his ethical responsibilities in a situation that
warranted disbarment, Ohio would, in the usual case, follow suit. 119
Only in that way could the true impact of the initial punishment be felt
— the lawyer would not be able to practice. Carrying over the sanction
from another jurisdiction, in the usual case, protects potential clients
from “a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit.” 120 It
also avoids the unseemly situation of a lawyer found unfit in one
jurisdiction being deemed good enough in another, which may
undermine the public’s confidence in the profession and the
administration of justice. 121 Most states allow exceptions under certain
article.
117. The ABA promoted the idea of reciprocal discipline more than forty years ago. See
SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 116–21 (June 1970) [hereinafter CLARK
REPORT], available at http:// www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_
Report.authcheckdam.pdf. It called again for its adoption in a major report in the early 1990s on
lawyer discipline. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 56 (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY
REPORT]. Reciprocal discipline remains a recommended disciplinary procedure. See MODEL
RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 22 [hereinafter MRLDE]. It has been
adopted in some form in most, if not all, jurisdictions.
118. The rule may also include giving reciprocal effect to a transfer of a lawyer to inactive
status due to a disability. See, e.g., MRLDE R. 22(A). Resignations in the face of disciplinary
charges may be given reciprocal effect as well. See, e.g., MD. R. ON CTS., JUDGES & ATTYS. 16773(d).
119. OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § (11)(F).
120. See MRLDE R. 22 cmt.; see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 117.
121. See MRLDE R. 22 cmt.; see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 117.
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circumstances, however, such as where the underlying conduct warrants
substantially different discipline in the second state than the first,122 the
original proceedings were so deficient as to constitute a denial of due
process, 123 or the proof in the original action was so insufficient that
reciprocal discipline would be inappropriate. 124
While the general concept of reciprocal discipline is well
established and widely adopted in some form in the states, there appears
to be some divergence over whether interim suspensions play a role in
this process. In the MRLDE 125 and in many states, 126 interim suspension
is not provided for in their reciprocal discipline rules, 127 presumably
because it is not needed. The disciplinary process for reciprocal
discipline is already a stream-lined one. 128 The finding of misconduct
122. See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(3); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(4); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6049.1(b)(1) (West 2003); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21(d)(4); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15(c)(4); ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 763; IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(4); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(c); R. DISCIPL. MISS.
STATE BAR 13; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(c); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(12)(d)(3); N.J. CT. R. 1:2014(a)(4)(E); N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(4); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 11(F)(4)(a)(ii); S.C.
APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(3) (2011); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 §
17.4(c); TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.04(D); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 14-522(d)(3); WASH. R. ENF.
LAWYER COND. 9.2(e)(1)(D).
123. See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(1); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(1); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6049.1(b)(3); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21(d)(1); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15(c)(1); ILL. SUP. CT. R.
763; IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(1); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(a); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(a);
N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(12)(d)(1); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-14(a)(4)(D); N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(1);
S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(1); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 17.4(a);
TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.04(A); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 14-522(d)(1); WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER
COND. 9.2(e)(1)(A).
124. See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(2); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(2); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6049.1(b)(2); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21(d)(2); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15 (c)(2); IND. ADM. &
DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(2); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(b); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(b); N.M. R. GOV’G
DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(2); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(2); TENN.
SUP. CT. R. 9 § 17.4; TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.04(B); WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND.
9.2(e)(1)(B).
125. MRLDE R. 22.
126. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 763; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-14(a); OHIO
GOV. BAR R. V § 11(F); PA. R. DISCIPL. ENF. 216; TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.01; WIS. SUP. CT. R.
22.22.
127. This does not mean that the underlying conduct will not trigger interim suspensions in
those states under another theory, such as threat of harm, but only that it is not expressly integrated
into their reciprocal discipline schemes.
128. This is implicit in the reciprocal discipline system, as reflected in this comment to Rule
22 of the MRLDE:
If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdiction and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is
instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected
against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit. Any procedure which
so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified. The spectacle of a lawyer disbarred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to
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has already been found in the other state’s disciplinary proceeding and is
treated as conclusive, 129 unless one of the limited exceptions applies. 130
Often the jurisdiction is able to impose identical discipline without
challenge by the respondent. While these rules give respondents a
limited ability to attack the underlying finding of discipline,131 I suspect
this happens rarely. In short, with a swift and easy process already in
place, little time is saved, and public protection provided, by adding
interim suspensions to the process.
Other jurisdictions do provide for the possibility of imposing an
interim suspension in the reciprocal discipline context while the
proceedings to impose final discipline are pending. 132 Given the
analysis above, this remedy may be seldom sought, but it remains
available in special cases where the underlying conduct poses such a
threat that immediate action is warranted. 133
Conviction of, or a finding of guilt 134 to a criminal offense 135 also
criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice.
MRLDE R. 22 cmt. It is in response to this concern that the stream-lined procedure was adopted.
129. See, e.g., MRLDE R. 22(E) (“a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer,
whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct or should be transferred
to disability inactive status shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the disability for purposes
of a disciplinary or disability proceeding in this jurisdiction”).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., R. GOV. D.C. BAR XI § 11(d) (authorizing interim suspension of lawyers
suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction pending imposition of reciprocal discipline); MD. R.
ON CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-773(d) (allowing interim suspension pending further order of a court
in another jurisdiction where lawyer has been “disbarred or is currently suspended from practice by
final order”); U.S. DIST. CT. R. N.D. CAL., CIVIL LOCAL R. 11-7.
133. Even without authority directly in the reciprocal discipline rule, disciplinary authorities
may reach the same result by seeking a threat of public harm suspension. See generally infra Part
VI.
134. While the original MRLDE provision based suspension on a lawyer’s “conviction” of a
serious crime. The rule was amended in 1999 substituting the phrase a “finding of guilt.” The
change arose from a recognition that “there can be significant delay between a finding of guilt and
the entry of a judgment of conviction, often attributable to presentence investigations and the
sentencing process. The rule change [was] designed ‘to protect the public and to uphold the honor
of the profession’ when a lawyer has been found guilty but has not yet been convicted. . . .” ABA
Delegates Tackle Lawyer Discipline, Defer Action on Law Firm and MDP Issues, LAWS. MAN. ON
PROF. CONDUCT ONLINE (ABA/BNA), 1999 WL 94186 (Feb. 17, 1999).
States vary on the terms of the disposition required before an order of interim suspension
will be entered. For example, some states require “conviction” of a crime. See, e.g., CONN. R.
SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 510(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(b); ME. BAR R.
7.3(d)(1); MICH. CT. R. 9.120(B)(1); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC.3:18(d). Other states
require that an attorney have been “found guilty” before imposing an interim suspension. See, e.g.,
IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a). Others call for an interim suspension when either conviction
or a finding of guilt occurs. See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13-22(A); WIS. SUP. CT. R.
22.20(1). That said, the dichotomy between “conviction” and a finding of “guilt” may not be as
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strong as it appears. For example, Nevada provides for interim suspension upon conviction, but
defines that term quite broadly to include “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a plea under North
Carolina v. Alford, or a guilty verdict following either a bench or a jury trial.” See NEV. SUP. CT. R.
111(1). Nevertheless, disputes still arise over whether a particular act constitutes a finding of guilt
or a conviction. See, e.g., Miss. Bar v. Shelton, 855 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 2003) (majority holding, over
strong dissent, that a conditional guilty plea is a guilty plea or conviction triggering suspension).
Finally, certain states explicitly state that interim suspensions are to be imposed on conviction
regardless of whether an appeal or other challenge to the conviction is pending. See, e.g., ME. BAR
R. 7.3(d)(1); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 111(7); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3:18(d). See generally
E.W.H., What Amounts to Conviction or Satisfies Requirement as to Showing of Conviction, within
Statute Making Conviction a Ground for Refusing to Grant or for Canceling License or Special
Privilege, 113 A.L.R. 1179 (1938 & Cum. Supp.).
135. There is generally more uniformity in the types of offenses that trigger an automatic
interim suspension. Most often, states require that an attorney be convicted or found guilty of a
“serious crime.” See, e.g., CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 510(a)(1); MD.
R. on CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-771(c); NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-312(A); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 111(7);
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.20(5). A typical definition of “serious crime” includes:
any felony or any lesser crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or any crime a necessary element of
which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of the crime, involves
interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a “serious crime.”
MRLDE R. 19(C); see also CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(c) (“The term ‘serious crime’ . . .
[includes] any felony or any larceny as defined in the jurisdiction in which the attorney was
convicted or any crime for which the attorney was sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which
a suspended period of incarceration or a period of probation was imposed.”). Even states whose
interim suspension provision is triggered by an offense other than a “serious crime” often track the
concepts within the MRLDE’s definition. For example, Virginia’s interim suspension provision is
triggered by conviction of a “crime,” which it defines as including a felony conviction, any “offense
involving theft, fraud, forgery, extortion, bribery, or perjury,” or any “attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy to commit” such offenses. VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13-1. Similarly, California
mandates the suspension of an attorney until the time for appeal has elapsed if “the crime of which
the attorney was convicted involved . . . moral turpitude or is a felony under the laws of California,
the United States, or any state or territory thereof.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6102(a) (West 2003
& Supp. 2012).
Interestingly, some states require an attorney to report a conviction of any crime,
regardless of how minor, while reserving an interim suspension for more serious criminal
convictions. Compare IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a)(2) (requiring an attorney to report a
finding of guilt of any crime under the laws of Indiana or the United States), with IND. ADM. &
DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a) (authorizing an interim suspension upon a finding that the attorney has
been “found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony”); see also ME. BAR R. 7.3(d)(1), (d)(6)
(requiring an attorney to report a conviction of any crime, but reserving automatic suspension for a
crime demonstrating “unfitness to engage in the practice of law”); MICH. CT R. 9.120(A)(1), (B)(1)
(requiring an attorney to report a conviction of any crime, but automatically suspending an attorney
only upon proof of conviction of a felony). The apparent justification for this divergence is twofold.
First, an “any crime” reporting rule simplifies the reporting duty. The lawyer need not make the
sometimes difficult determination of whether the nature of his crime makes it a “serious” one. Cf.
Greenbaum, supra note 116, at 496–97. That determination is left to those in the disciplinary
system. Second, the divergence is a recognition that, while in the usual case, the damage to the
lawyer’s reputation and the inconvenience to the lawyer’s clients accompanying an interim
suspension can only be justified when the underlying criminal offense is serious, nevertheless,
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can lead to an interim suspension pending a final determination of
whether the criminal activity warrants disciplinary sanction as well.136
The idea behind interim suspensions, in this context, is that conviction of
a crime of sufficient magnitude calls into question whether the lawyer
has the character to deal honestly with clients and to serve them loyally
in their representations. 137 It also is a nod to the reality that the
punishment associated with these crimes may, as a practical matter,
impede the lawyer’s ability to handle matters competently and
diligently. 138 Maintaining public confidence in lawyers and the
disciplinary system also is served by taking immediate action against
lawyer/criminals. 139 While the interim suspension is in place, authorities
then determine what, if any, final disciplinary action is appropriate. 140
That said, the interim suspension usually is not automatic and may,
at times, be stayed for good cause. 141 In In re Downey, for example, an
knowledge of the commission of the lesser crime, when coupled with other factors, might still
justify a public harm suspension or the imposition of a final disciplinary sanction.
136. The ABA began promoting the idea of interim suspensions for criminal convictions of
serious crimes more than forty years ago. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 122–30. It called
again for the adoption of such interim suspension rules in a major report in the early 1990s on
lawyer discipline. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 117, at 56. Interim suspensions for criminal
convictions of serious crimes remain a recommended disciplinary procedure. See MRLDE R.
19(D). For examples of such suspensions see In re Schwartz, 931 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 2010) (interim
suspension based on felony conviction) and In re Minor, 958 So. 2d 675 (La. 2007) (interim
suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime). For an interesting discussion of whether
these provisions should be applied to convictions from a foreign country, see In re Wilde, 68 A.3d
749 (D.C. 2013).
137. Fear also has been expressed that lawyers knowing they face imprisonment and probable
loss of license will be more likely to exploit current clients for their own gain. See CLARK REPORT,
supra note 117, at 125. Even if they would not, other lawyers who know of the criminal conduct
may be reluctant to deal with the convicted lawyer, which, in turn, will undercut that lawyer’s
ability to represent existing clients. Id.
138. Id.
139. As the Clark Report found, “[n]o single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to
blame for any lack of public confidence in the integrity of the bar than the policy that permits a
convicted attorney to continue to practice while apparently enjoying immunity from discipline.” Id.
at 124; accord MRLDE R. 19(D) cmt. For a spirited debate among the judges on whether the
maintenance of public confidence is properly considered in deciding whether to impose an interim
suspension for a guilty plea or conviction of a serious crime see Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Protokowicz, 607 A.2d 33 (Md. 1992).
140. The conduct underlying a criminal conviction also may warrant disciplinary sanction in
its own right. This is seen most clearly in Rule 8.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which prohibits “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” It should be recognized that this rule does
not speak to all criminal acts of a lawyer, but only those that reflect adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice. Mere crimes of moral turpitude that do not implicate
these factors are not covered by this rule. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) cmt. [2].
141. The rules authorizing interim suspensions in this context, while phrased differently,
almost always leave the court or its delegee some discretion in terms of whether an interim
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interim suspension of a lawyer who had been convicted of engaging in
the business of money transmission without a license, a serious crime,
was stayed. The court reasoned:
Applying these considerations, we conclude that respondent has shown
good cause for the court to stay the interim suspension. His prior unblemished record as an attorney; his plea of guilty to what amounts to a
strict liability offense involving no scienter or moral turpitude; and the
fact that his violation arose from conduct outside of his normal legal
practice all suggest a very low degree of risk that permitting him to
practice in the interim will harm the public. For the same reasons, but
subject of course to development of a factual record in the disciplinary
process, we think that the likelihood that respondent will receive a significant sanction, i.e., a suspension (if at all) of more than brief duration, is very small. Stated differently, there is a reasonable possibility
on this record that interim suspension might exceed the sanction that
will eventually be imposed on respondent. Considering, finally, the
harm to respondent’s livelihood and ability to support his family that
interim suspension may entail, we conclude that respondent has met
his burden to show good cause for why the court should stay its
142
hand.

suspension should be entered. The MRLDE is among the more stringent, requiring that the lawyer
“shall” be suspended, but that the suspension may be terminated “in the interest of justice . . . upon a
showing of extraordinary circumstances.” MRLDE 19(D)(2). Others are more generous, simply
noting that the court or its delegee “may” enter an interim suspension on these grounds. See, e.g.,
CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR. COMM’N R. 510(a)(1); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(b). In
contrast, a few seem to make imposition of the interim suspension mandatory. See, e.g., MISS. ST.
BAR R. OF DISCIP. 6(a). For a discussion of the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion,
see Chief Disciplinary Counselor v. Briggs, No. HHDCV 1360400635, 2013 WL 3970785 (Conn.
Super. Ct., July 18, 2013).
142. In re Downey, 960 A.2d 1135, 1137 (D.C. 2008), opinion amended on reh’g, 975 A.2d
152 (D.C. 2009). Maryland reached the same conclusion. Att’y Grievance Comm. v. Downey, 990
A.2d 1070 (Md. 2010); see also In re Respondent M, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 465 (Review Dep’t
1993) (finding good cause not to impose an interim suspension for driving under the influence
causing an injury, a felony, in part because the ultimate disciplinary sanction, if entered, would be
less severe than the interim suspension given the time it would take to reach a final disposition); In
re Grillo, 960 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (setting aside interim suspension for criminal
conviction for good cause, applying N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4)(f)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v.
Protokowicz, 607 A.2d 33, 35 (Md. 1992) (noting that rule, then in force, permitted but did not
require the imposition of an interim suspension for criminal conviction); cf. State v. Kirsch, No. CR
980178336, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2567 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2000) (upholding interim
suspension pending appeal for felony convictions resulting from a fatal automobile collision which
the defendant caused while driving drunk, but modifying it to allow non-court practice by
respondent if clients are notified about the criminal convictions, acknowledge notification in
writing, and waive conflicts, if any, associated with the conviction); see also Order of Temporary
Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board at 38, In re Whittemore, No. 64154 (Nev. Oct. 8,
2013) (Hardesty, J. concurring in part and dissenting) (arguing that lawyer, presently under an
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As to the collateral effects of such a suspension, at least in Ohio, an
interim suspension for a felony does not constitute a prior disciplinary
offense, and thus does not serve as an aggravating factor in other
disciplinary matters. 143 Depending on the circumstances, credit may be
given for the time served on interim suspension if a final suspension for
the underlying conduct is ordered. 144
A more difficult question is how to respond where a lawyer has
simply been indicted for a serious crime. Should interim suspensions be
entered there as well? 145 Several states have a specific rule dealing with
this situation, although they vary on whether the imposition of an
Others find
interim suspension is mandatory or permissive. 146
indictment a factor which, when coupled with the nature of the
underlying charges, might warrant a public harm suspension. 147 Note
that, in the latter case, the mere fact of indictment is not enough, a threat

interim suspension pending appeal of a felony conviction, should be allowed, under all the
circumstances, to continue to represent his current clients outside of state court proceedings).
143. Disciplinary Counsel v. Peterson, 984 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Ohio 2012) (“‘Our precedent
indicates that a prior interim felony suspension has not heretofore been considered as a prior
disciplinary offense.’”); see also In re Maxwell, 44 So. 3d 668, 675 n.12 (La. 2010) (noting that an
interim felony conviction does not constitute prior discipline when considering mitigating and
aggravating factors).
144. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 929 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ohio 2010)
(comparing and contrasting cases differing on whether to give credit for an interim suspension when
imposing final discipline based on the commission of a crime by the lawyers involved); Disciplinary
Counsel v. Margolis, 870 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ohio 2007) (discussing the differing approaches
taken and concluding that where the magnitude of the misconduct is large and compelling evidence
of contrition is lacking, credit for an interim suspension is inappropriate).
145. The focus here is on whether the state should impose interim suspensions premised on
indictment of a crime. It should be noted that where the facts underlying the crime also implicate an
ongoing disciplinary proceeding, the lawyer may desire that the disciplinary proceeding be delayed
until the criminal case concludes in order to best preserve constitutional rights. At times, the lawyer
may request an interim suspension be imposed, presumably to procure agreement to postpone the
disciplinary proceeding. See, e.g., In re Galette, 737 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 2013).
146. Compare OKLA. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. PROC. 7.3 (providing that “[u]pon receipt of the
certified copies of . . . indictment . . . the Supreme Court shall by order immediately suspend the
lawyer from the practice of law until further order of the Court”) (emphasis added), with ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 774(a) (providing that court “may suspend” lawyer “during the pendency of a criminal
indictment”) (emphasis added), and N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(9)(i) (allowing but not requiring
suspension upon indictment), and S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(17) (providing that court “may place a
lawyer on interim suspension upon notice of the filing of an indictment, information, or complaint
charging the lawyer with a serious crime.”) (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., In re Perkins, 807 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind. 2004) (finding public harm suspension
appropriate where lawyer was charged with insurance fraud and drug dealing and could not make
bail, leaving approximately 100 pending client matters unattended); see also N.M. R. GOV’G
DISCIPL. 17-207A(5)(c) (providing for interim suspension upon indictment where “continued
practice of law by an attorney will result in a substantial probability of harm, loss or damage to the
public”). See generally infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
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of public harm must be established as well. 148
Thus, it appears that most jurisdictions do not require automatic
interim suspension upon indictment. This is appropriate. Unlike the
situation involving conviction or a finding of guilt, where misconduct is
established by the criminal proceeding, no final determination that the
lawyer, in fact, engaged in the criminal conduct has been made.
Therefore, an investigation into that matter should be required to
determine if the suspension is warranted. 149
As for the costs interim suspensions impose, they seem justified, at
least in situations involving a former finding of serious discipline or
conviction of a serious crime. In these instances the likelihood of final
discipline for the underlying conduct is strong. If a disciplinary
suspension or disbarment is the likely end result of the disciplinary
process in any event, the imposition of an interim suspension will have
only a marginally larger impact, moving the suspension up in time, than
the ultimate sanction itself.
V. DISCIPLINARY PROCESS SUSPENSIONS
Several types of interim suspensions arise out of the disciplinary
process itself. Some flow from a lawyer’s failure to respond to requests
made in the disciplinary process. 150 For example, failure to respond to a
148. See, e.g., In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Mass. 1997) (noting that “indictment does
not alone justify [an interim suspension]” but that taken with other evidence may justify a threat of
harm suspension).
149. See, e.g., In re Monteiro, 684 P.2d 506, 507 (Nev. 1984) (invoking the presumption of
innocence and finding that indictment for a serious crime, without more, does not show a sufficient
threat of harm to warrant interim suspension). That does not mean that a pre-suspension hearing
need be had if the suspension is of delayed effect and the lawyer has a right to request a hearing
during that time. See, e.g., Burleigh v. State Bar of Nev., 643 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Nev. 1982).
Further, continued practice by a lawyer who is under indictment, but has not yet been allowed to put
on a defense, may not have the same negative effect on public confidence as continued practice by
an attorney who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a serious crime, one of the traditional
justifications for suspensions in this area. See supra note 139; cf. Jeremy S. David, Case Comment,
Constitutional Law—Presumed Innocent Until Proven Guilty?: Extending the Grounds for
Temporary Suspension of Attorneys — In Re Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (1997), 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 349, 358 (1998) (asserting this basic position). Nevertheless if the charges
themselves are sufficiently serious, public confidence might indeed be eroded. See, e.g., Burleigh,
643 P.2d at 1204 (determining that “continued practice with serious charges [here attempted murder
and arson] leveled against [the indicted lawyer] would erode public confidence in the legal
profession”).
150. See, e.g., S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(c) (lawyer who has failed “to fully respond to a notice
of investigation, has failed to fully comply with a proper subpoena issued in connection with an
investigation or formal charges, has failed to appear at and fully respond to inquiries at an
appearance required . . . or has failed to respond to inquiries or directives of the Commission or the
Supreme Court,” is subject to interim suspension). TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3 (allowing for the
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grievance, 151 provide requested documentation, 152 file responsive
pleadings, or attend a scheduled proceeding, 153 all can lead to an
immediate suspension. So, too, can failure to follow orders issued by
Noncooperation in a proceeding
the adjudicatory authority. 154
concerning the mental and physical capacity of a lawyer to remain in
active practice also can lead to an interim suspension. 155 Some states do
not treat disciplinary process suspensions separately, but make them
another basis for proving a public harm suspension is warranted. 156 My

entrance of a temporary suspension when a lawyer fails to respond to disciplinary officials
“concerning a complaint of misconduct”); VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3
(authorizing imposition of interim suspension for failure to respond to a summons or subpoena);
WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 7.2(a)(3) (permitting entrance of an interim suspension for failure to
provide requested information or documents, or failure to respond to a subpoena, or failure to
comply with disability proceedings).
151. See, e.g., GA. R. PROF’L COND. 4-204.3 (d) (providing that “[i]n cases where the
maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension, failure to respond by the respondent may authorize
the Investigative Panel or subcommittee of the Panel to suspend the respondent until a response is
filed”); see also In re Wathen, 721 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. 2012) (ordering interim suspension for
failing to respond to notice of investigation which respondent had received); In re Stewart, 934
N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (entering interim suspension, inter alia, for failure to
answer or contact the disciplinary body); In re Kern, 722 S.E.2d 520, 521 (S.C. 2012) (describing
earlier action in which an interim suspension was entered, inter alia, for “failure to provide a written
response to the investigation”).
152. See, e.g., VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3; In re Lyons, 599 N.Y.S.2d 643
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (imposing interim suspension for lawyer’s failure to produce requested
records).
153. In re Kern, 722 S.E.2d at 521 (describing earlier action in which an interim suspension
was entered, inter alia, for failure to appear as required); In re Way, 952 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2012) (ordering interim suspension in case involving repeated delays in answering disciplinary
complaint, failure to attend deposition in the matter, and failure to respond to requests to cure this,
although only the failure to attend the deposition was cited as the noncooperation supporting interim
suspension); In re Stewart, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (interim suspension imposed for a number of
reasons including failure to appear at deposition scheduled in the disciplinary process).
154. VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.1.
155. WYO. ST. BAR BYLAWS art. 1 § 3(i)(6) (authorizing interim suspension where lawyer in
such an investigation fails to provide authorization for release of relevant medical records); see also
In re Stern, 946 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (interim suspension imposed, in part, for
failure to submit to psychiatric examination to evaluate lawyer’s mental capacity).
156. For example, in New York an attorney may be suspended
from the practice of law pending consideration of charges of professional misconduct,
upon a finding that the attorney is guilty of professional misconduct immediately threatening the public interest. Such finding may be based upon: . . . (i) the attorney’s default
in responding to the petition or notice, or the attorney’s failure . . . to comply with any
lawful demand of this court or the Departmental Disciplinary Committee made in connection with any investigation.
N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1). For application of this standard see, e.g., In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d 101,
103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (entering immediate suspension for lawyers failure “to comply with the
Committee’s lawful request for documentation, to respond to its subpoenas and to answer multiple
complaints”); In re Bloodsaw, 926 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (ordering immediate
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view is that suspensions for noncooperation are an important, justifiable
tool to secure participation in the disciplinary process despite the costs
such suspensions impose. Disciplinary proceedings are at the heart of
lawyer regulation which noncooperation impedes. That said, they are
but one of an array of tools available to police this area and a sensitive
consideration of when these various tools should be utilized is required.
To the extent the noncooperation is the result of the invocation of
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, it should not lead
to an interim suspension for noncooperation. 157 It may, however, if it is
determined that the privilege does not lie. 158 And, in any event, in some
jurisdictions the tribunal may draw an adverse inference about the
underlying conduct if the privilege is invoked. 159
Lack of cooperation need not automatically lead to an interim
suspension. Thus, in one case, the court refused to order an interim
suspension for threat of harm to the public based on lack of cooperation
where the failure to cooperate was intermittent and often was caused by
scheduling conflicts resulting from the representation of the lawyer’s
clients. 160

suspension where “[r]espondent has disregarded a judicial subpoena and, in the words of the
Committee, has ‘demonstrated a strategy of silent entrenchment, a calculated refusal to
acknowledge repeated Committee inquiries, or even submit an answer to the complaint of [the]
Court Examiner[ ] . . . . in the face of serious allegations, allegations implicating inter alia, tens of
thousands of dollars intended for the care of a mentally incompetent person for whom Respondent
was guardian’”).
157. See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (plurality opinion) (finding
disbarment for invocation of
Fifth Amendment rights in a disciplinary proceeding
unconstitutional); In re Kapchan, 924 N.Y.S.2d 338, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that
“merely invoking one’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination should not serve as a
separate ground for an interim suspension”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 cmt. [2].
158. Cf. In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04 (finding that “[a]lthough an attorney cannot be
suspended on an interim basis solely for asserting his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination . . . he cannot assert such a right merely to avoid production of records or documents
which an attorney is required to maintain” and ordering an interim suspension, in part, for
noncooperation from improper raising of the Fifth Amendment privilege.) See generally
Disciplinary Counsel v. Snaider, No. NNHCV116024179S, 2012 WL 1221482 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2012) (finding that IOLTA records fall within the required records exception to the Fifth
Amendment and ordering their disclosure).
159. Compare In re Redding, 269 Ga. 537, 537 (Ga. 1998) (noting that an adverse inference
may be drawn from a respondent’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination in a disciplinary matter), and In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (same), and State ex rel.
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Gasaway, 863 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Okla. 1993) (same), with Att’y Grievance
Comm’n of Md. v. Unnamed Att’y, 467 A.2d 517, 521 (Md. 1983) (noting that no adverse inference
may be drawn from an attorney’s refusal to testify against himself in a disciplinary proceeding), and
In re Woll, 194 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Mich. 1972) (same).
160. In re Martin, 90 So. 3d 392, 393 (La. 2012). In declining to enter an interim suspension
based on a need to protect against public harm, the court noted that
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As a general matter, the threat of immediate suspension is a useful
tool to encourage cooperation by those charged in the disciplinary
process and to avoid the cost and delays occasioned by respondent
neglect. 161 Because this suspension flows from a failure to cooperate in
the proceeding itself, rather than from the underlying misconduct being
prosecuted in the disciplinary proceeding, and because the interim
suspension can be lifted by mere compliance, if a final sanction of
suspension is ordered, 162 credit will not be given for the time the lawyer
was under default suspension. 163 Because the default suspension is
premised on the need to exact cooperation in the underlying proceeding,
it expires when a sanction for the underlying misconduct is reached. 164
failure to appear before the ODC was due to scheduling conflicts resulting from her need
to appear in court on behalf of her clients. While respondent could have made a more
diligent effort to balance her client’s interests with her duty to cooperate with the ODC,
we cannot say her actions were contumacious in nature, nor do they demonstrate a potential for harm to the orderly administration of the disciplinary investigation. Therefore,
without passing on whether respondent’s failure to cooperate rises to the level of a disciplinary offense, we conclude it does not constitute grounds for immediate interim suspension.
In re Martin, 90 So. 3d 392, 393 (La. 2012).
161. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 551
(Iowa 2012); Jerry Cohen, Appropriate Dispositions in Cases of Lawyer Misconduct, 82 MASS. L.
REV. 295, 308 (1997) (describing such conduct by lawyers as “a great obstacle to efficient oversight
with limited resources”). Nevertheless, the author also identifies “a need for restraint in exercise of
those remedies to avoid tragic escalation arising out of misunderstanding or disability.” Cohen,
supra, at 308.
162. See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR XI § 3(d) (“An attorney temporarily suspended or placed
on probation for failure to file a response to a Board order . . . shall be reinstated and the temporary
suspension . . . dissolved when (1) Bar Counsel notifies the Court that the attorney has responded to
the Board’s order or (2) the Court determines that an adequate response has been filed by the
attorney”); GA. ST. CT. R. 4-204.3(d)(3) (authorizing reinstatement where lawyer suspended for
failure to respond in a disciplinary proceeding makes an appropriate response); see also In re
Warnock, 525 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 2000) (lifting interim suspension for failure to file a timely answer
when answer filed); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 870 n.3
(Iowa 2010) (noting that a temporary suspension for non-response in a disciplinary proceeding is
cured upon response and requires that the court, after appropriate notice of that fact, must
“‘immediately reinstate the attorney’s license to practice law’”). However, if the default is treated
as a separate disciplinary offense, see infra text accompanying notes 168-69, mere compliance may
be insufficient to forestall the imposition of additional discipline for noncooperation. See, e.g., In re
Lilly, 699 A.2d 1135 (D.C. 1997) (finding noncooperation to violate both the D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct and a Bar rule and imposing a 30-day suspension conditioned upon full
compliance with Bar Counsel’s information request).
163. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 553. But cf. In re Coleman, 607 S.E.2d 556 (Ga. 2005)
(giving credit, in the context of a petition for voluntary suspension, for time spent under
noncooperation suspension).
164. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(e)(2) (if not cured, noncooperation suspension continues
“until such time as the disciplinary matters before the Committee have been concluded, and until
further order of the court”); In re Burke, 861 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (suspending
attorney until pending disciplinary matters have concluded); Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 554
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While under suspension, the usual duties of notification and cessation of
practice apply. 165 Reciprocal discipline in another jurisdiction might
also be entered, 166 and the failure to cooperate may be treated as a prior
disciplinary offense in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding. 167
That said, failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process is
punished in many other ways than immediate suspension. For example,
it can be treated as another disciplinary violation to be added to those
already being prosecuted. 168 As one court commented in justifying this
approach:
[Noncooperation in the disciplinary process] not only show[s] blatant
disregard for this Court’s authority, but reveal[s] how little they value
their license to practice law. . . . Lawyers who fail to discharge these
minimal burdens to protect their own interests cannot be expected or
trusted to act to protect the interests of clients, the public and the legal
169
profession.

It may also be treated as an aggravating factor when establishing the
sanction for the underlying disciplinary charges. 170 To the extent the
(noting that “since this opinion concludes the present disciplinary action, there is no longer a need to
‘prompt a response to the board’s inquiries,’ and the temporary suspensions [for noncooperation]
are accordingly dismissed”). That of course is not true if the state decides to treat noncooperation as
a separate disciplinary offense, rather than as an interim suspension in a proceeding evaluating other
misconduct. See generally infra text accompanying notes 168-69.
165. IOWA STATE CT. R. 34.7(3)(g)-(h) (detailing client notification requirements upon
noncooperation suspension); VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3 (requiring notification
of clients, opposing counsel and courts, as well as making “appropriate arrangements for the
disposition of matters then in his or her care in conformity with the wishes of his or her clients”
where interim suspension for failure to comply with a summons or subpoena is imposed).
166. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 635 S.E.2d 694, 695 n.4 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (noting reciprocal
discipline had been entered for noncooperation suspension in another state).
167. See, e.g., In re Hammock, 602 S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga. 2004) (treating suspension for
noncooperation in a previous disciplinary proceeding as prior discipline and thus an aggravating
factor); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009) (same).
168. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of the
rules of a tribunal) & 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand from a disciplinary
authority); IOWA STATE CT. R. 32:8.1(b); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4 (h); see also In re Edwards, 990
A.2d 501, 524-26 (D.C. 2010) (finding noncooperation in a disciplinary proceeding to violate rules
requiring response to a lawful demand from disciplinary authorities [8.1] and prohibiting conduct
that seriously interferes with the administration of justice [8.4(d)]); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Iowa 2012) (sanctioning lawyer for violating Iowa’s
“cooperation” disciplinary rule); State v. Crawford, 827 N.W.2d 214, 235 (Neb. 2013) (imposing
discipline, finding noncooperation to be prejudicial to the administration of justice and a violation of
the lawyer’s oath of office). See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Failure to Co-operate with
or Obey Disciplinary Authorities as Ground for Disciplining Attorney — Modern Cases, 37
A.L.R.4th 646, § 3[a] (1985 & Cum. Supp.).
169. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747, 752 (Okla. 2012).
170. See, e.g., AM. B. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS STD. 9.22(e)
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lack of cooperation involves a failure to answer or appear, it might be
treated as an admission of the facts not responded to 171 or as grounds for
entering discipline by default. 172
This potential array of multiple remedies could be implemented in a
variety of ways. It might be left to prosecutorial discretion to determine
which remedy or remedies best fit the situation. Alternatively, a state
might arrange them in an order of increasing severity, placing additional
pressure on the respondent to cooperate in the process. For example, in
Ohio, the first step is notifying the respondent that, absent response to
the complaint, the default will be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court. 173
If the failure to respond continues, the next step is interim suspension. 174
If a response is still not forthcoming, the interim suspension may be
converted into an indefinite suspension 175 or possibly disbarment. 176
As to the collateral consequences that flow from the imposition of

(1992) (treating as an aggravating factor “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 2012) (treating failure to respond to
and cooperate with the Board’s investigation as an aggravating factor); In re Gustafson, 986 N.E.2d
377, 379 (Mass. 2013) (noting that “failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process may be
considered as a factor in aggravation of other misconduct”).
171. See, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 36.7 (providing that “[i]f the respondent fails or refuses to file such
answer within the time specified, the allegations of the complaint shall be considered admitted, and
the matter shall proceed to a hearing on the issue of the appropriate sanction”); LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX,
§ 11(E)(3) (providing that upon failure to answer a disciplinary complaint “the factual allegations
contained within the formal charges shall be deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing
evidence”); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. COUNCIL 4:01 § 8(3)(a); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(24)(a) (“Failure to
answer the formal charges shall constitute an admission of the factual allegations.”); S.C. APP. CT.
R. 213(24)(b) (“If the respondent should fail to appear when specifically so ordered by the hearing
panel or the Supreme Court, the respondent shall be deemed to have admitted the factual allegations
which were to be the subject of such appearance and to have conceded the merits of any motion or
recommendations to be considered at such appearance.”); S.C. APP. CT. R. 213(27)(a) (“The failure
of a party to file a brief taking exceptions to the report constitutes acceptance of the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations.”). For cases applying these standards see Hearity, 812
N.W.2d at 616–17 (applying Iowa’s “admission” provision); In re Pittman, 76 So. 3d 425, 431 (La.
2011) (noting that if a “lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those
charges are deemed admitted.”); In re Hursey, 719 S.E.2d 670, 673 (S.C. 2011) (treating failure to
answer formal charges and appear at a proceeding as an admission of the factual allegations
contained in the formal charges). See generally Landis, supra note 168, at § 4.
172. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 6a(D)–(F).
173. OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 6a(A).
174. Id. at § 6a(B).
175. Id. at § 6a(E)(1).
176. Id. at § 6a(F)(2)(a)(iii). A system is employed in New York in which if an interim
suspension, including one for noncooperation, has been entered, and the suspended lawyer does not
appear or apply in writing for a hearing or reinstatement for more than six months after its entrance,
the lawyer may be disbarred without further notice. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(g); see also In re Reis, 960
N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (disbarring lawyer under this provision).
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an interim suspension for obstructing the disciplinary process, this
situation might appear analogous to administrative suspensions. In both,
the interim suspension is provided as leverage to compel compliance
with a duty to the system. In the administrative suspension area, I
worried that the costs may be too great and that alternative approaches
should be explored. 177 Nevertheless, the situations differ significantly.
In contrast to administrative suspension, failure to cooperate in the
Further,
disciplinary process is itself a disciplinary offense. 178
noncooperation undercuts the core functioning of the disciplinary
process. 179 As such, the failures here are more than ministerial and thus
justify the more intrusive sanction.
VI. INTERIM SUSPENSIONS FOR PUBLIC HARM
Several competing policies are at work when thinking about
whether and when to impose an interim suspension pending final
disposition on a lawyer whose conduct is the subject of a disciplinary or
capacity inquiry. On the one hand, the lawyer regulatory system owes a
duty to protect the public from lawyer misconduct, misconduct that may
well continue throughout the often lengthy disciplinary process. 180 On
the other hand, even an interim suspension is a drastic remedy. 181 For
many lawyers, their sole means of livelihood is halted. 182 The inability
of these lawyers to continue to serve their clients also can have negative

177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
See supra text accompanying note 168.
See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 827 N.W.2d 214, 238 (Neb. 2013).
AM. BAR ASS’N CENTER FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, 2010 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, chart V, item 21b,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart52010
sold.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting for many states average times from receipt of a complaint to
imposition of a public sanction of well over a year, with several states reporting a two-year period)
(The
full
report
is
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_sold_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf).
See
generally State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747, 758 (Okla. 2012) (lamenting that
failure to seek interim suspension in a disciplinary action that took two years to conclude left “the
lawyer and the public dangling like participles in suspension for years at a time”).
181. Cf. In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 2001) (recognizing the difficulties imposed by even
a temporary suspension of a law practice).
182. That is not always the case, however. In one instance, where an interim suspension was
entered because the lawyer was acting as a lawyer in thousands of debt collection matters across the
United States, thereby engaging in unauthorized practice, while being subject to numerous
consumer complaints and state attorney general challenges in the process, the court noted that the
lawyer could still engage in some debt collection as a non-lawyer, mitigating the harm he would
suffer from the interim suspension. In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159 (Cal. State Bar Ct. Review
Dep’t Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf.
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impacts on clients and those dealing with them, such as the courts,
regulators, and third parties. These consequences argue for caution. 183
As one court put it:
The harm to a lawyer that will come from the suspension of his right to
practice law is obviously substantial. Not only will the lawyer lose his
clients (at least during the period of suspension), but his reputation will
probably be damaged in a way that cannot be repaired even if the lawyer later receives total vindication in the disciplinary process. The
lawyer who loses his practice may well be adversely affected in the defense of criminal and disciplinary charges arising from the alleged
misconduct, at least in his ability to afford counsel. Moreover, a temporary suspension can burden the lawyer’s clients who must seek representation elsewhere at the risk of delay and greater expense. Because
of the substantial and likely harm that would arise from a temporary
suspension that later proves to have been entered improvidently, [the
Massachusetts rule] requires that there be a showing of a threat of future harm that in the public interest must be guarded against by a tem184
porary suspension.

Nevertheless, at some point, the need to protect the public is so
compelling that the power to impose an interim suspension in this
context may lie in the inherent authority of the state supreme court, even
in the absence of a rule on point. 185
In balancing the need for public protection against the costs
suspensions entail, each state must determine the severity of the threat
and the certainty of its occurrence necessary to support interim relief.
The current ABA model has two points of emphasis: (1) the threat of
harm must be “substantial,” and (2) the potential harm must be
“serious.” 186 States vary in how they treat each of these factors.
For example, as to the likelihood of occurrence, Pennsylvania’s
rule, at least on its face, tightens the “substantial threat” standard by
limiting the interim suspension to instances in which the lawyer’s

183. See, e.g., In re Malvin, 466 A.2d 1220, 1223 (D.C. 1983) (emphasizing “that a temporary
suspension is an extreme measure, reserved for exceptional cases, and that the Board must therefore
make a strong showing of ‘great public harm’ as required by the rule. A temporary suspension
should not be sought, and will not be granted, in a routine disciplinary case.”); Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 659 (W. Va. 1995) (recognizing that temporary
suspensions of this kind should only be entered in the most extreme cases of lawyer misconduct).
184. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161–62 (Mass. 1997).
185. W. Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Ikner, 438 S.E.2d 613, 617–18 (W. Va.
1994).
186. MRLDE R. 20(A) (premising interim suspensions on a showing that the lawyer “poses a
substantial threat of serious harm to the public”).
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continued practice “is causing immediate or substantial public or private
harm.” 187 New Mexico tempers this somewhat, requiring a finding that
the lawyer’s conduct “will result in a substantial probability of harm,
loss or damage to the public.” 188 Similarly, Oregon provides for interim
suspension when disciplinary authorities can show that the lawyer’s
continued practice “will, or is likely to, result in substantial harm to any
person or the public at large.” 189 New York seems to fall somewhere in
between. That state’s rule focuses on situations where continued
practice by the lawyer is “immediately threatening the public
interest.” 190
As to the degree of harm that must be threatened, the ABA shifted
its stance over time on this issue. At one point, the ABA required a
showing that the lawyer “poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to
the public.” 191 That standard was criticized for being unduly restrictive,
as the “irreparable harm” language suggested the need to meet the
standards for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,192 and was
replaced by a need to show only “substantial threat of serious harm.” 193
Nevertheless, some states retain a version of the older model. 194
Another approach some states employ in describing the harm
necessary to justify interim suspension, is to identify particular conduct
187.
188.
189.
190.

PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1) (emphasis added).
N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-207(A)(5) (emphasis added).
OR. BAR R. PROC. 3.1(a) (emphasis added).
N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1) (1997) (emphasis added). Wyoming’s rule is similar. WYO.
DISCIPL. CODE § 17(a) (interim suspension triggered by a showing of “imminent threat of
substantial harm to the public” from continued practice).
191. MRLDE R. 20(A) (1989).
192. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 117, at 55 (finding that the “irreparable harm” standard
imported requirements for the granting of temporary restraining orders that were inappropriate in
the disciplinary context). But cf. TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.01 (providing for the entrance of an
interim suspension through a preliminary injunction).
193. MRLDE R. 20(A) (emphasis added). This is the standard in many states. See, e.g., N.J.
CT. R. 1:20-11(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(A)(1); S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(b); VT. SUP. CT.
ADMIN. ORDER NO.9, R.18A; WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 7.2(a)(1)(A).
194. Some states still employ the “irreparable harm” standard. See, e.g., N.D. R. LAWYER
DISCIPL. 3.4(A)(2) (interim suspension authorized where lawyer “poses a substantial threat of
irreparable harm to the public”); OKLA. DISCIPL. PROC. R. 6.2A (interim suspension allowed where
the lawyer’s conduct “poses an immediate threat of substantial and irreparable public harm”); TEX.
R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02 (interim suspension authorized for conduct that “poses a substantial threat
of irreparable harm”); R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518(a) (interim suspension predicated upon
“substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public”); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3.27(a)
(interim suspension authorized where lawyer poses “substantial threat of irreparable harm to the
public”); In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 979 (Utah 2001); cf. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Mass.
1997) (noting that although the state’s interim suspension rule “does not announce that principles
applicable to the issuance of a preliminary injunction should guide the temporary suspension issues,
those principles are instructive”).
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that poses a sufficient threat for future misconduct, as well as a catch-all
category to capture substantial harms not otherwise listed. This
approach gives some additional guidance to lawyers about the
consequences of their actions and to disciplinary authorities as to the
kinds of matters worthy of special attention. For example, Arkansas
permits interim suspensions when the attorney has engaged in
misappropriation, abandoned an active law practice, or poses a
substantial threat to the public or clients. 195 Pennsylvania’s rule focuses
on situations where the lawyer “is causing immediate and substantial
public or private harm because of the misappropriation of funds . . . or
because of other egregious conduct, in manifest violation of the
Disciplinary Rules or the Enforcement Rules.” 196 Tennessee also
specifically mentions misappropriation as one ground for a temporary
suspension. 197 In addition, it identifies failure to respond to a
disciplinary complaint 198 and failure to substantially comply with a
lawyer assistance program contract, along with the catchall for any other
conduct that “poses a threat of substantial harm to the public.” 199 The
Texas rule identifies three conditions that can satisfy its “substantial
threat of irreparable harm” standard: (1) conduct that meets all the
elements of a “Serious Crime,” (2) three or more acts of professional
misconduct, or (3) “any other conduct . . . that, if continued, will
probably cause harm to clients or prospective clients.” 200
While most states require a significantly likely threat of a
substantial harm, others seem to have more permissive interim
suspension provisions. Rhode Island, for example, authorizes its
disciplinary counsel to seek an immediate suspension “when it is
necessary for the public’s protection.” 201 Wisconsin has an even less
demanding standard – suspension may be entered where “it appears that
the attorney’s continued practice of law poses a threat to the interests of
the public and the administration of justice.” 202 Note that neither the
likelihood of the occurrence, nor the gravity of the harm is spelled out.
Interrelated to the overall standard is the burden of proof the state
195. ARK. SUP. CT. PROC. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW §
17(E)(3)(c)(i)-(iii). This rule also allows for the imposition of interim suspensions “[a]t the moment
the Committee decides to initiate disbarment proceedings.” Id. at § 17(E)(3)(a).
196. PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1).
197. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3.
198. Others treat this under a separate noncooperation provision. See supra Part V.
199. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3.
200. TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02.
201. R.I. R. SUP. CT. art. III, R. 5(b)(6).
202. WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(1).
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must meet to justify an interim suspension. The higher the burden, the
less likely it is that interim sanctions for threat of harm will be imposed.
Choosing that evidentiary standard again requires a balancing of the
need for public protection with the costs associated with imposing
interim suspensions. Here again we see variation across the states.
Some states require a showing of probable cause. 203 Others employ a
preponderance of the evidence standard, 204 while others insist upon clear
and convincing evidence. 205
It is unclear whether these variations across the states make a
difference in fact. Perhaps the states really are trying to finely hone the
balance between the need for public protection and the significant
burden suspensions cause. The language chosen and the burden of proof
applied set the mood point for how regular or rare interim suspensions
should be. Nevertheless, the reality of when to seek and when to impose
interim suspensions may be far more visceral. The case law seldom
reflects a close parsing of the language of the standards or the burden of
proof involved.
The power to impose interim suspensions for threat of harm, at
whatever likelihood of harm and seriousness of harm standards are
chosen, is not unbounded. Two limitations attach, although one may be
largely semantic.
First, the device is not a blanket authorization to seek out and
curtail lawyer misconduct. Rather it is but an interim step available in
the context of an ongoing disciplinary investigation or proceeding, 206 or
203. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); WYO. DISCIPL. CODE § 17(b). While disciplinary authorities in
Wyoming need only show there is probable cause to believe the lawyer poses a sufficient threat, the
lawyer when seeking to dissolve the interim suspension must show by clear and convincing
evidence that she no longer poses such a threat. WYO. DISCIPL. CODE § 17(d).
204. TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02; cf. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Mass. 1997)
(requiring for an interim suspension a preponderance of the evidence standard showing of a
violation of a disciplinary rule and that “on a balance of the harms and consideration of the public
interest, the lawyer poses a threat of substantial harm to present or future clients or in other
respects”).
205. R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-517(b) (providing that unlike most disciplinary matters in
Utah in which violations must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, motions for
interim suspension must be established by clear and convincing evidence); In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d
972, 979 (Utah 2001) (applying the Utah rule then in force); David, supra note 149, at 356-57
(arguing for a clear and convincing evidence standard given the severe nature of the sanction and a
desire to minimize erroneous determinations of fault). But see In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d at 1157
(rejecting the clear and convincing evidence requirement).
206. See MRLDE R. 20 (allowing interim suspension predicated upon sufficient evidence that
the lawyer has violated a disciplinary rule and poses a substantial threat to the public “pending final
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conduct causing the harm”); accord
IOWA CT. R. 35.4; MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.24; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11; N.D. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. 3.4(A)(1);
OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(A)(1); R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518; W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL.
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other event. 207 It is because of this that the interim suspension typically
ceases when the full disciplinary proceeding is concluded 208 and the time
served may be credited toward any final suspension imposed. 209
The second limitation is the object of the threat. While it may be
largely semantic, state rules vary as to who or what must be threatened
with the requisite harm to warrant an interim suspension. Concerns are
variously expressed for threat of harm to prospective clients, 210
clients, 211 an attorney, 212 any person, 213 the public, 214 the public

PROC. 3.27; In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Mass. 1997); see also N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1)
(allowing interim suspension for public harm with respect to “an attorney who is the subject of an
investigation, or of charges by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of professional
misconduct, or who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding pending in this court against whom a
petition has been filed pursuant to this section, or upon whom a notice has been served pursuant to
section 603.3(b) of this Part”).
207. While most states tie interim suspensions to disciplinary investigations or proceedings,
some are more expansive. New Mexico, for example, requires that the lawyer be under
investigation by disciplinary counsel “for an alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
or a violation of a court rule, statute or other law,” have filed against him “formal disciplinary
charges,” or a “criminal complaint, information or indictment”). N.M. R. GOV’G BAR DISCIPL. 17207(A)(5); see also CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42 (providing that either a pending disciplinary
proceeding or an overdraft notification suffices as the context in which an interim suspension may
be sought).
208. In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 973 n.1 (Utah 2001) (noting that interim suspension is a
temporary suspension “pending a final determination of whether permanent discipline is
necessary”); see, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 35.4(2) (providing that court may enter order immediately
suspending attorney pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the
conduct posing a substantial threat of serious harm to the public); N.D. ST. CT. R. 3.4(B) (attorney
may be suspended “pending final disposition of the proceeding predicated upon the conduct causing
the harm”); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413 § 17(b) (“Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a
lawyer poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the administration of justice, the
Supreme Court may suspend the lawyer . . . pending a final determination in any proceeding under
these rules.”); R. GOV’G UTAH ST. B. R. 14-518(b) (“the district court may enter an order
immediately suspending the respondent pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding
predicated upon the conduct causing the harm”).
209. See, e.g., In re Pittman, 76 So. 3d 425, 432 n.3 (La. 2011) (noting that the court has
“historically chosen to exercise [its] discretion to make suspensions run retroactive to the date of
prior interim suspensions” and applying that practice here); In re Durante, 926 N.Y.S.2d 642, 646
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (giving credit for time served on interim suspension toward full disciplinary
suspension in a case involving multiple violations in handling client funds); In re Edin, 697 N.W.2d
727, 731 (N.D. 2005) (concluding that term of suspension for underlying misconduct should begin
date interim suspension ordered); In re Bentley, 714 S.E.2d 279, 279 (S.C. 2011) (ordering that
definite suspension of two years for misconduct be treated as retroactive to the date of respondent’s
interim suspension).
210. TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 2.14(B).
211. MRLDE R. 20 cmt.; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a); TEXAS R. DISCIPL. PROC. 2.14(B).
212. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a).
213. OR. BAR R. 3.1(a).
214. MRLDE R. 20 cmt.: ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R.
V § 5a(A)(1); OR. BAR R. 3.1(a); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3; WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND.
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interest, 215 the legal profession, 216 or the administration of justice. 217
States often string several of these together. 218
While the choice may signify a difference in the scope of the
interim suspension rule, 219 the larger the group included, the greater the
instances in which interim suspensions are warranted, that is not readily
apparent from a review of the case law. One exception to that general
statement is In re Reiner’s Case. 220 In that case, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire construed a New Hampshire rule that allows for the
imposition of interim suspensions pending the resolution of criminal
charges when “it is both necessary for the protection of the public and
for the preservation of the integrity of the legal profession.” 221 Insisting
that both prongs must be met, the court denied an interim suspension of
a lawyer indicted for promoting prostitution and money laundering. 222
The court agreed that an interim suspension might be necessary to
preserve the integrity of the profession, but determined that it was not
needed to protect the public given that the alleged criminal actions did
not involve misconduct directed toward clients. 223
Regardless of the exact standard employed, the statutes and case
law provide guidance on the types of misconduct that have been found to
warrant interim suspension. 224 Some forms of conduct, in and of
themselves, seem particularly likely to be repeated and hence often raise
High among them is
a substantial risk of public harm. 225
misappropriation 226 or admitted failure to pay money owed to a client, 227
7.2(a)(1)(A); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3.27(a).
215. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(e)(1).
216. ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a).
217. MRLDE R. 20 cmt.; ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(b).
218. See generally supra notes 210-17 and the rules cited therein in multiple footnotes.
219. For example, the comment to Rule 20 of the MRLDE indicates that interim suspensions
are appropriate for misconduct that “poses such an immediate threat to the public and the
administration of justice that the lawyer should be suspended immediately,” but is “also appropriate
when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is causing or is likely to cause serious injury to a client or the
public” MRLDE R. 20 cmt. It is unclear what conduct falls in one category, but not the other.
220. In re Reiner’s Case, 883 A.2d 315 (N.H. 2005).
221. Id. at 318 (citing N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(16)(f)).
222. Id. at 319.
223. Id.
224. Some states treat conviction of a serious crime under the threat of public harm provision.
Others treat it as a separate category. I have chosen to treat it as a separate category. See supra text
accompanying notes 134-44.
225. Even here, however, a pattern of misconduct is more likely to be pursued than an isolated
incident, as the latter may not suggest a future threat.
226. MRLDE R. 20 cmt. (conversion of trust funds warrants interim suspension); accord ARK.
SUP. CT. PROC. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATT’Y AT LAW § 17(E)(3)(c)(i); PA. DISCIPL.
BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3; see, e.g., In re Schachter, 952 N.Y.S.2d
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such as failure to pay fee arbitration awards. 228 Disappearance and/or
abandonment of law practice also pose an obvious threat. 229
Capacity issues also deserve a close look. Most states have
provisions to suspend, or transfer to inactive status, a lawyer suffering
from a disability that significantly impairs the lawyer’s capacity to
practice. 230 Even with these provisions in place, however, swifter action
may be necessary if the lawyer’s continued practice poses a substantial
and immediate threat to the public. Where this is the case, an interim
suspension may be warranted. 231
Arrest or indictment for criminal conduct also is a common trigger
for interim suspensions. In some states, a separate rule governs this
situation. 232 In others, the conduct underlying the arrest or indictment
may trigger a public harm suspension. 233 The suspension is not
168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); In re
Myers, No. 59866, 2012 WL 652756 (Nev. Feb. 24, 2012). At least in New York such conduct
appears to automatically constitute an immediate threat to the public. See, e.g., In re Riley, 957
N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (imposing public harm suspension despite argument there was
no threat of pubic harm where only a single act of misappropriation, which was repaid by the
attorney, was involved); cf. In re Gibson, 960 N.Y.S.2d 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (rejecting claim
of no immediate threat of public harm despite argument that the misappropriations had been repaid,
no client complaints had been made, and the misconduct was two-years old and had not recurred).
Other states differ. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. Reviewing Comm. v. Hillman, 2000
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2541 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2000) (denying interim public harm
suspension where respondent admitted to three instances of misconduct involving the same client,
including two involving misappropriation); cf. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Discipl. Bd. v. Powell, 830
N.W.2d 355, 356 (Iowa 2013) (terminating interim suspension for trust account errors upon a
showing that the errors were the result of “sloppy procedures and oversight,” substantial measures
had been adopted to avoid these problems, and the trust account shortage had been rectified).
227. The New York rule specifically identifies this conduct as immediately threatening the
public interest thus warranting an interim suspension. N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(iv); see In re Bloodsaw,
926 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (applying this standard).
228. 2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 17 (noting that
21 percent of the cases warranting “emergent discipline” (interim suspension or conditions)
involved non-payment of fee arbitration awards).
229. MRLDE R. 20 cmt. (abandonment of practice warrants interim suspension); accord ARK.
SUP. CT. PROC. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 17(E)(3)(c)(ii); W. Va.
State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Ikner, 438 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1994).
230. See, e.g., MRLDE R. 23 (providing for transfer to inactive disability status in these
circumstances).
231. See, e.g., MRLDE R. 20(A); OKLA. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. PROC. 6.2(A); R. GOV’G UTAH
STATE BAR 14-518(a); VT. R. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 9, R. 18A; W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIP.
PROC. 3.27(a). In Washington, if a hearing to determine whether a transfer to inactive disability
status has been ordered, disciplinary authorities “must petition the Supreme Court” for an interim
suspension. WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 8.2(d).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 146.
233. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hanson, No. CV054017144, 2006 WL 2349162 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 28, 2006); In re Shepherd, 990 So. 2d 734, 735 (La. 2008) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(noting two cases, In re Dillon, 918 So. 2d 466 (La. 2006), and In re Hammond, 917 So. 2d 433
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automatic, however; the requisite threat of harm to the public must be
shown. 234
In other instances, it is the repeated nature of the misconduct or the
extent of the misconduct in question that justifies the interim
suspension. 235 For example, in one case, substantial misconduct in the
litigation process, such as violating confidentiality orders and suggesting
that a subordinate alter documents to create claims of work product, was
so extensive as to warrant interim suspension. 236 Another court found
wide-spread unauthorized practice of law in a nationwide debt collection
practice sufficiently repeated and substantial to justify an interim

(La. 2005) — both involving sexual misconduct — where each attorney received an interim
suspension following an indictment because of the threat of public harm in continuing to allow the
attorney to practice); In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (Mass. 1997); Burleigh v. State Bar of Nev., 643
P.2d 1201 (Nev. 1982); ); In re Wolff, 767 N.W.2d 170, 170–71 (N.D. 2009).
234. See, e.g., Hanson, No. CV054017144, 2006 WL 2349162, at *4 (“The problem with
creating a per se rule that an arrest and pending charges against a criminal defense lawyer should
result in an automatic interim suspension is that it simply sweeps too broadly and ignores the risk
faced by lawyers of unfounded arrests and charges by disgruntled and/or vindictive clients or
opponents, notwithstanding the probable cause requirement for an arrest. That is why a case by
case rather than a per se rule makes sense.”); cf. In re Clark, 25 So. 3d 728, 730 (La. 2009) (lawyer
“arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, distribution of marijuana,
possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia,” although all in small amounts, was
placed on interim suspension for his threat of harm; based on subsequent evaluation of his ability to
handle the practice, interim suspension was dissolved).
235. See, e.g., MRLDE R. 20 cmt. (noting that a pattern of misconduct may warrant interim
suspension); TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02 (providing that a lawyer who has committed three or
more acts of professional misconduct conclusively establishes that the attorney poses a substantial
threat of irreparable harm warranting interim suspension); see also In re Cyrus, 241 P.3d 890
(Alaska 2010) (repeated failure to communicate with clients and attend court hearings prompting
numerous complaints from judges before whom he was appearing, coupled with failure to respond
to the disciplinary charges, warranted interim suspension on harm to the public grounds); In re
Saghir, 632 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (receipt of additional complaints while interim
suspension proceeding was pending helped reinforce concern of danger to others); In re Romano,
660 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (repeatedly giving female clients inappropriate intimate
physical examinations in cases where they alleged physical injury warranted interim suspension);
Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Nichols, 570 S.E.2d 577 (W. Va. 2002) (finding that
multiple allegations that lawyer agreed to file lawsuits for clients, failed to do so, and then lied to
clients that the suits had been filed warranted interim suspension); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 660 (W. Va. 1995) (finding pattern of deceitful conduct and repeated
negotiation of inappropriate loans from clients in violation of Rule 1.8(a) justified interim
suspension); In re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 16 (N. Mar. I. Feb. 1, 2013) (premising interim
suspension on the fact that eleven complaints had been filed against Woodruff “ranging from lying
about filing a criminal appeal to having several cases dismissed with prejudice due to lack of
diligence . . . suggest[ing] that Woodruff routinely fails to follow through regarding cases he takes”
and “declin[ing] to risk a similar fate for current and future clients”).
236. In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on 109-page district court
sanction order imposing more than 24 separate reprimands or sanctions to justify interim
suspension), final suspension order rev’d and remanded, 642 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2011).
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suspension. 237
Special concern also arises when particularly vulnerable clients
have been harmed by the lawyer. 238 Both the predatory aspect of the
conduct and fear for other vulnerable clients seem to drive interim
suspensions here.
It is important to note that interim suspension is warranted
regardless of whether the lawyer appreciates the wrongfulness of his
actions. 239 The focus is on protecting the public from harm, not the
motivation of the lawyer in engaging in the conduct. 240 In fact, failure to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct may suggest that the
misconduct is likely to be repeated absent an interim suspension. 241
At first look, there appear to be substantial reasons to allow for
interim suspensions to protect against public harm, but that does not end
the inquiry. An interim suspension regime, in this context, is more
justified if disciplinary counsel and the courts are given sufficient
discretion in determining whether to seek interim suspensions and
sufficient latitude to consider other remedies to protect the public from
harm.
The first question is how much discretion should be accorded to
disciplinary authorities in deciding whether to seek interim suspension
and the adjudicatory body in whether to impose it. Some statutes appear
237. In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159 (Cal State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t Apr. 15, 2008),
available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf (finding that lawyer’s use of
California law license and California law firms as leverage in conducting nationwide debt-collection
activities probably constituted unauthorized practice, thereby warranting interim suspension
pending completion of the disciplinary process).
238. See, e.g., In re Saghir, 632 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (imposing interim
suspension on lawyer who used a runner to obtain clients in prison whose cases she then neglected
and with whom she failed to communicate, in part because “Respondent’s misconduct is aimed at
particularly vulnerable clients in the form of inmates who are not sophisticated about the legal
system, and who may maintain unrealistic hopes about post-conviction relief”).
239. In re Romano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding that continued practice
of performing improper physical examinations of female clients after already having been
temporarily suspended for the practice, and having testified that he had given up that practice,
warranted an additional temporary suspension; noting that “even if respondent’s motives were
entirely sincere, his admitted inability to comprehend the problem with his actions establishes that
he poses an immediate threat to the public interest”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli,
457 S.E.2d 652, 661 (W. Va. 1995) (noting, in imposing interim suspension, that lawyer refused to
recognize the wrongfulness of engaging in unfair loan transactions with his clients and continued to
do so even after being warned by disciplinary counsel that his conduct violated Rule 1.8(a)).
240. At least one court has held that the intent of the lawyer to violate the disciplinary rules is
not necessary to be shown, unless that is an element of the underlying offense. In re Trujillo, 24
P.3d 972 (Utah 2001).
241. In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (predicating interim suspension on extensive
litigation misconduct and “the danger of recurrence demonstrated by respondent’s lack of
appreciation of the wrongfulness of her misconduct”).
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to limit the discretion of disciplinary counsel in determining whether to
seek interim suspension. 242 At least one judge has excoriated the bar for
working out other accommodations, rather than following the interim
suspension rule, where the provision for interim suspension for
conviction of a crime was involved. 243 The concern was that such acts
deprived the court of its rightful authority to determine the suspension
issue. 244 To my mind, this criticism goes too far, at least if it applies to
public harm suspensions. Given the limited resources available to
disciplinary counsel, pursuing possible interim suspension for public
harm must be balanced against other resource needs. Proving
misconduct twice, first for an interim suspension and then for a final
disposition, may not be warranted if the need for a suspension is not
clear cut. One’s stance on this issue may explain some of the divergence
across the states in terms of how often interim suspensions for public
harm are imposed. 245
To the extent the decision to seek an interim suspension is
discretionary, 246 disciplinary counsel weigh many factors in deciding
whether or not to pursue an interim suspension. Certainly an appraisal
of the true likelihood of future public harm is at the top, but disciplinary
counsel also may consider seeking an interim suspension for the indirect
leverage it provides.
For example, it may spur cooperation.
Disciplinary counsel may make it known that cooperation in the
investigation of the underlying grievance and voluntary acceptance of
certain conditions on practice, such as agreeing to be supervised by a

242. MRLDE R. 20(A) (providing that upon receipt of sufficient evidence to meet the interim
suspension standard, disciplinary counsel “shall” file for an interim suspension); accord CONN.
PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42; R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518(a); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL.
PROC. 3.27(a); see also Donald R. Lundberg, Two Case Studies in the Exercise of Discretion in
Lawyer Discipline Systems, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 107, 117 (noting that under the MRLDE the
disciplinary counsel “is seemingly required . . . to seek emergency interim suspension” when the
applicable standard is met, whereas in some states this is a discretionary call).
243. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Conrady, 275 P.3d 133, 140 (Okla. 2012) (Kauger, J.,
concurring).
244. Id. at 143.
245. In 2010, 541 suspensions for risk of harm or criminal conviction were imposed
nationwide, with an average of eleven and a mean of four. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 SURVEY ON
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY SYSTEMS, chart II, clm. 10d., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/chart22010sold.authcheckdam.pdf (Lawyers Interimly
Suspended (for Risk of Harm or Criminal Conviction)) (The full report is available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_sold
_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf). California led the jurisdictions with 161. Id. Next highest was the
District of Columbia with 58. Id. Thirty-three states had fewer than ten, with eight reporting zero.
Id. The following reported “n/a:” Georgia, New Mexico, and Virginia. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 242-45.
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monitor, might get disciplinary counsel to forgo pushing for a public
harm suspension on the theory that such cooperation lessens the
likelihood of the lawyer engaging in further misconduct during the
investigation and hence reduces the risk of harm to the public. 247 For
others, the threat of an interim suspension may lessen the desire of the
lawyer to prolong the disciplinary process in order to continue to
practice law for as long as possible. The potential swift entrance of an
interim suspension may spur resignations or acquiescence in disbarment
where the lawyer’s misconduct is serious and clear. 248
As for the court considering imposing an interim suspension for
public harm, discretion is likely to lie. 249 The court has the ultimate
authority to regulate the bar 250 and needs some freedom in doing so,
consistent with an even-handed approach to the application of the
standards. This is reinforced by the idea that the court may decide, in a
particular case, to pursue alternative measures to limit harm, rather than
use interim suspension as the sole vehicle for doing so. 251
In exercising this discretion, the courts have to balance the harms
that accrue from imposing interim suspensions with the public interest in
preventing future harm. 252 While most opinions do not unpack the
factors considered in this weighing, a few do. The Utah Supreme
Court’s opinion, in In re Trujillo, provides as example. The court

247. Alternatively, it may frighten some respondents into obtaining counsel in the disciplinary
matter who may, in turn, help restrain the lawyer from causing additional harm.
248. Tips for Bar Counsel, 10 LAW. MAN. ON PROF CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 11, at D15
(Current Reports, June 29, 1994) (reporting the comments of an Illinois disciplinary official noting
this fact and that it is less expensive than going through a full disciplinary proceeding).
Even if the lawyer is unwilling to give up her license, the threat of interim suspension may
lead to increased consents to discipline. In this regard, interim suspensions may be seen as
analogous to pre-trial detention; the individual is subject to restraint (loss of a right to practice; loss
of freedom) pending a final resolution of the underlying violation alleged. It has been widely
recognized, in the criminal law context, that this gives substantial leverage for prosecutors to secure
plea bargains in exchange for release from restraint. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2493 n.116 (2004). The same may be true in the
interim suspension context. A lawyer may be more likely to enter into a consent to discipline
arrangement to dissipate the effect of the interim suspension, particularly if no credit will be given
the time under interim suspension when imposing a final disciplinary sanction. Agreeing to
discipline now may lessen the total time a suspension will be in place.
249. See, e.g., CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42 (court “may” order interim suspension if it finds
lawyer poses substantial threat of irreparable harm); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(1) (court “may”
suspend where it “appears” lawyer may pose a threat to the public or the administration of justice).
250. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §1 cmt. c (2000) (noting
that in most states the courts have the inherent power to regulate lawyers and that in many states
that power is exclusive).
251. See infra text accompanying notes 259-64.
252. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Mass. 1997).
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articulated the following factors to consider in the weighing:
(1) whether the public will suffer irreparable harm unless the order of
interim suspension issues, (2) whether the threatened injury to the public outweighs whatever damage the proposed order may cause the at253
torney temporarily suspended from the practice of law, (3) whether
the proposed order, if issued, would be adverse to the public interest,
and (4) whether there is a substantial likelihood, based on all the available evidence, that a significant sanction will be imposed on the attor254
ney at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings.

When weighing these factors, the costs interim suspensions pose
must be kept in mind. As stated before, a suspension requires the lawyer
253. Applying this factor, where the lawyer has alternative means of financial support, the
weight given the lawyer’s interest will lessen. See, e.g., In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159, ¶ 106
(Cal.
State
Bar
Ct.
Review
Dep’t
Apr.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf. The potential length of the interim
period of suspension before a final determination is reached might also be considered. Some states
require that if an interim suspension is entered, the state must prosecute the underlying grievance in
a timely or expedited manner. See, e.g., OR. BAR R. PROC. 3.1(h)(i) (requiring accelerated
proceedings following temporary suspension); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(3), (4) (setting expedited time
limits for filing a disciplinary complaint and the referee’s report on it where lawyer is under
temporary suspension for threat of harm); see also In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d at 1160 (noting that
formal disciplinary hearings “must be instituted within a reasonable time” after temporary
suspension entered); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 659 (W. Va.
1995) (requiring disciplinary counsel to expedite the resolution of the charges against the lawyer
and move to conclude the matter within 90 days after the interim suspension becomes effective); In
re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 18 (N. Mar. I. Feb. 1, 2013) (requiring expedited resolution of
disciplinary action since interim suspension entered). If the respondent fails to cooperate or
interferes with the formal proceeding, however, the amount of time that will be deemed
“reasonable” may increase. Cf. In re Abrams, 767 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Mass. 2002) (finding sixmonth delay in the institution of proceedings reasonable given respondents failure to turn over
relevant documents or to follow the requirements of the interim suspension order). Other states
place a burden on the respondent to request expedited treatment. See, e.g., OKLA. STATE DISCIPL.
PROC. R. 6.2A (4); PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(f)(1).
254. In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 979 (Utah 2001); cf. Order of Temporary Suspension and
Referral to Disciplinary Board at 38, In re Whittemore, No. 64154 (Nev. Oct. 8, 2013) (order
denying petition for reinstatement) (majority and dissent applying Trujillo factors in considering
petition for reinstatement from an interim felony suspension, but disagreeing on how the factors
should be applied). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals articulated a similar standard in In
re Malvin, taking into account:
(1) whether the attorney is causing irreparable public harm by misappropriating client
funds to his own use, or by other means, (2) whether there is a substantial likelihood,
based on all the available evidence, including affidavits, that a significant sanction will
be imposed on the attorney at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings,
(3) whether the balance of injuries, as between attorney and clients, favors a temporary
suspension, and (4) whether the public interest would be served by a temporary suspension.”
In re Malvin, 466 A.2d 1220, 1223 (D.C. 1983); accord In re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 16 (N. Mar. I.
Feb. 1, 2013) (articulating a similar standard citing, inter alia, Trujillo and Malvin).
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to cease practice. This not only threatens a lawyer’s livelihood, but
imposes costs upon the lawyer’s clients to find new counsel, and on
courts and other parties who must suffer the delay this shift in counsel
entails. Indirect consequences are imposed upon the lawyer, as well, to
the extent the interim suspension triggers reciprocal suspensions in other
jurisdictions, 255 is treated as a prior disciplinary offense in a subsequent
disciplinary proceeding, 256 or has a negative effect on the lawyer’s
malpractice insurance. 257 There are also consequences on a personal
level. The suspension stigmatizes the lawyer, affecting reputation and
relationships, as well as the well-being of the lawyer’s family members
who have to cope with the situation.
Those factors must be balanced against the court’s appraisal of the
degree to which an interim suspension is necessary to protect the public.
In addition, the court also may consider whether imposition of an interim
suspension is necessary to send a message to the public and the
profession that certain misconduct will have immediate negative
consequences for those who commit it. 258
The availability of alternatives that may adequately protect the
public while minimizing the social costs that flow from entrance of an
Given the
interim suspension also should be considered. 259
255. See, e.g., HAW. R. SUP. CT. 2.15(a)(4) (applying reciprocal discipline to interim
suspensions); In re Nalick, 50 So. 3d 149 (La. 2010) (imposing reciprocal discipline for a public
harm based interim suspension); In re Pesante, 930 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (same).
256. Even if a jurisdiction decides to treat a public harm interim suspension as a prior
disciplinary offense, an aggravating factor, in subsequent disciplinary cases, such suspensions
should not be treated as a prior disciplinary offense when deciding the ultimate sanction in the very
proceeding in which it was entered. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 830
N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 2013) (noting that “prior discipline is not an aggravating factor when it is
intertwined in the current case. . . . Moreover, an interim suspension for conduct involved in a case
can be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the length and adequacy of a suspension as a
sanction in the case.”). But see In re R.A.H., 684 S.E.2d 631, 632 (Ga. 2009) (treating as prior
discipline an interim suspension entered in the case being considered).
257. In Texas, for example, if after an interim suspension the respondent is found not to have
committed any professional misconduct, the interim suspension “may not be deemed a sanction for
purposes of insurance applications or any other purpose.” TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.01. The
implication is that if professional misconduct is ultimately found, the interim suspension could be
deemed a sanction for insurance purposes.
258. The ability to send such a message turns, in part, on how much detail is provided in the
court decision and order imposing the suspension. In many states that amounts to little more than a
pro forma statement that the standard for interim suspension has been met and it is therefore so
ordered. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rohe, 86 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 2012), as modified (Apr. 2, 2012); In re
Gilmore, Jr., 88 So. 3d 441 (La. 2012); In re Iler, 210 N.J. 121 (2012); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n
Certified Grievance Comm. v. Lemieux, 958 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2011); In re Newton, 722 S.E.2d
800 (S.C. 2012); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Wyo. State Bar v. Shreve, 269 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2012).
259. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Macneill, No. CV 980585852, 1999 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1219, at *8–9 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 11, 1999) (finding that respondent did pose “a
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consequences of interim suspensions, courts often are provided the
option of employing other sanctions to protect the public. 260 If the
misconduct being investigated involves mismanagement of a trust
account, for example, a financial monitor might be ordered in lieu of the
temporary suspension. 261 If the lawyer’s misconduct stems from poor
law office management, a trustee might be appointed to oversee the
office. 262 If concerns flow from substance abuse issues, deferral to the
state’s lawyers assistance program and a monitored course of treatment
might be sufficient. 263
In considering these options, two principal considerations lie. The
first is attempting to accurately assess whether the alternative control is
likely to be successful. This will turn on such factors as the severity of
the alleged disciplinary violation, the attitude shown by the respondent
during the investigation and related proceedings, and the success rate of
substantial threat of irreparable harm to his clients or to prospective clients,” but that “less
draconian measures” were called for since an interim suspension “would severely and
indeterminately punish him before a full hearing is had on the merits”). That said, since this is an
exercise of discretion, there is no requirement to impose the “least restrictive sanction available.”
See, e.g., In re Abrams, 767 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Mass. 2002) (rejecting that as a limitation in upholding
the imposition of an interim suspension as an exercise of discretion).
260. MRLDE R. 20(B) (providing that the court may impose an interim suspension or “order
such other action as it deems appropriate”); accord MASS. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42(b); N.J. CT. R.
1:20-11(c); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(B); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3.27(c). South
Dakota provides a non-exclusive list of optional restrictions or conditions that include: “requiring
the attorney to provide proof of professional negligence insurance or the posting of a fidelity bond.”
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-35.1 (2011). I have found only sporadic figures on how often these
alternatives are implemented. See, e.g., 2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
SYSTEM REPORT 17 (noting that license restrictions in lieu of interim suspension were employed in
a few cases most years).
261. See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3 (recognizing temporary probation as an alternative to
temporary suspension, and that restrictions of trust account access may be part of a temporary
probation); 2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 16 (noting the
option to impose conditions rather than ordering an interim suspension and that that might include
“oversight by a proctor of the attorney and/or the trust account”); Actions from the Board of
Professional Responsibility, TENN. B. J., Dec. 2000, at 9 (describing a Tennessee case in which a
temporary suspension was dissolved subject to conditions, including the appointment of a financial
monitor to review and report to disciplinary authorities on a monthly basis).
262. Cf. Macneill, No. CV 980585852, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1219, at *9 (denying
request for interim suspension and imposing other requirements including the filing of quarterly
reports of the lawyer’s caseload status and working under the supervision of a court-appointed
monitor); In re Hirschfeld, 960 P.2d 640, 641-42 (Ariz. 1998) (faced with the situation in which a
lawyer, subject to sizeable monetary sanction for misconduct in a domestic relations proceeding,
subsequently failed to appear at various show cause hearings and fled the jurisdiction leaving some
clients unrepresented, the Arizona Supreme Court denied interim suspension but placed the lawyer
on probation under the supervision of a practice monitor pending the bar’s final determination of the
charges; probation subsequently lifted and an interim suspension imposed).
263. In re O’Brien, No. 59215, 2012 WL 988056 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2012) (ordering counseling,
in lieu of an interim suspension, of lawyer who self-reported two DUI convictions).
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the option when used in the past.
The second is a resource consideration. 264 Are there lawyers in the
jurisdiction willing to play the monitor function? Are they trained to do
so? Will they have the time to provide the oversight needed? If there are
not, should the court create a cadre of officials within the disciplinary
process who are trained in these roles?
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have attempted to describe and analyze the world of
administrative and interim suspensions. That overview reveals that
suspensions are used in a variety of settings, with different justifications
and somewhat different consequences depending on the context
involved. Given the substantial costs such suspensions impose, I argue
for tempering those consequences in certain settings, such as pure
administrative suspensions, and for employing less disruptive sanctions
wherever possible.
What remains, and is the next step for this project, is to explore
how the authorities make decisions about when to use these devices
where they have discretion as to how to proceed. Take, for example,
public harm suspensions. Is the low frequency of interim suspension for
public harm a product of their being few cases where the public is at
risk, or a conscious decision to forgo this remedy? If disciplinary
authorities are reluctant to seek interim suspensions, even though there is
a sufficient threat of public harm, what are the reasons behind that
choice? Are there structural improvements one could make in the
mechanics of seeking interim suspensions, the consequences of them, or
the range of alternatives that might alter current choices? These and
other questions await further exploration.

264. The resource issue seems substantial on first blush, but may well be overstated. If an
interim suspension is ordered, a court may appoint another to handle the practice of the suspended
lawyer for a period of time. See, e.g., In re Jones, 739 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 2013) (appointing lawyer to
assume duties with respect to interimly suspended lawyer’s practice, applying S.C. APP. CT. R.
413(31)). Appointing some sort of practice monitor, in lieu of an interim suspension, might actually
place fewer burdens on the system and the appointed lawyer.
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